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Résumé exécutif
L'essai, intitulé Commercialisation et Privatisation Associative de l'Aide au
Développement, tente de percer la réticence qu'a le secteur du développement
international face à l'implication d'une gestion commerciale au sein d'effort de
développement. Plus précisément, cet essai tente de démontrer le rôle que peut
jouer l'introduction du système de gestion, emprunté au secteur privé, sur
l'efficacité de l'aide au développement par l'augmentation de son efficience
allouée. Contrairement à d'autres analyses antérieures, je fais la distinction
entre l'efficience productive/budgétaire et l'efficience allouée qui se base sur les
objectifs d'entraide et sociaux de l'intervention.
En premier lieu, l'essai tente de démontrer les avantages qui peuvent être tirer
d'une meilleure efficience allocative. Je démontre qu'il est important de prendre
en considération la motivation demere un projet d'aide pour déterminer si
l'efficience est bien le moyen approprié d'atteindre l'efficacité optimal. Je justifie
la quête de l'efficience par le besoin d'accroître la crédibilité du secteur du
développement. La diminution des allocations publiques à la coopération
internationale, en proportion du produit national brut des pays de OCDE, fait
aussi appel à l'augmentation des efficiences, de façon à augmenter la valeur
ajoutée de chaque dollar reçu de leur subvention en décroissance pour, au
moins, maintenir leur efficacité antérieure. A ce stage, je présente un modèle
économique qui tente de démontrer les bénéfices que peuvent tirer les projets
d'aide par l'augmentation de leur niveau d'efficience au travers d'augmentation
des donations privées stimulées par une plus grande confiance en l'efficacité du
projet.
Ensuite, je propose une commercialisation du secteur de la coopération
intemationale comme moyen d'augmenter ce type d'efficience. Je définie le
concept de la commercialisation dans cet essai comme toute introduction de
technique de gestion empruntée aux entreprises à but lucratif œuvrant dans un
secteur de marché compétitif qui permet l'introduction, ou la simulation, des
forces de marché compétitif. La commercialisation peut prendre plusieurs
envergures : du simple appel à un(e) consultant(e) venant du secteur privé à
l'extrême que représente la passation de la propriété et, du même fait, du
contrôle d'un projet d'aide au secteur privé par la privatisation de celui-ci.
La seconde partie de cet essai se concentre spécifiquement sur ce demier
thème, celui de la privatisation d'effort d'aide au développement. Tout en
précisant que la privatisation, comme moyen d'atteindre un efficience attribuée
maximale, et du même fait, l'efficacité optimale, ne s'applique qu'à une minime
fraction des projets d'aide, je tente de faire l'introduction de ce concept, quelque
peu innovateur, comme une alternative valable et, sous certaines conditions,
même nécessaires au politique de gestion de la coopération internationale
courante. Dans cette partie de l'essai, j'identifie les projets d'aide qui sont
compatibles à l'altemative de la privatisation et j'argumente qu'un certain nombre
de ceux-ci, non seulement peuvent être privatisés, mais doivent l'être. Pour ce
faire, je distingue entre quatre types de projets d'entraide : ceux dont les objectifs
ont été atteints, ceux dont les fonctions peuvent être absorbés par des
organismes locaux, ceux dont les fonctions peuvent être accomplies par les
secteurs privés locaux existants et finalement, ceux dont les fonctions ne
peuvent être efficacement entrepris par aucun organisme, privé ou non. Dans
mon analyse, j'argumente que seulement les projets d'aide tombant dans la
quatrième catégorie devraient être sujets à une politique de privatisation.
Ensuite, je présente quelques considérations qui devraient motiver le choix d'un
projet d'aide pour la privatisation.
I  ej I '
Je poursuis en Illustrant, brièvement, les façons de mener une privatisation. Cet
acheminement nous mène à l'introduction de la formule associative comme le
modèle d'entreprise que devrait adopter les projets d'aide au développement
durant leur privatisation. J'explique les bienfaits d'une telle structure d'entreprise
et sa comptabilité avec la mission sociale de la plupart des projets d'entraide.
Je conclus l'essai en offrant au lecteur un exemple concret ou la privatisation
associative d'un projet d'aide au développement a été tenté. J'élatx)re les
circonstances qui ont mené à l'adoption d'une telle politique de gestion. J'évalue
si ce choix fut le bon. Je décris brièvement la méthodologie utilisée pour
atteindre ce but, et je présente les résultats qu'a eu cette expérience. Cette
tentative de privatisation fut un échec. Donc, je tente de décrire ce qui a mené à
ce résultat, tout en offrant quelques suggestions de changement qui auraient pu
éviter cet échec.
Cet essai fait la présentation d'un concept qui pourrait être considéré innovateur,
et pour ce faire, est en plusieurs lieux une élaboration non-scientifique, mais
plutôt, une extrapolation, due à la faute de littérature sur ce thème, que je fais sur
ce nouvel outil de gestion disponible au secteur de l'aide au développement. Vu
cette présentation du sujet, et vu qu'il s'agit d'un essai et non d'une thèse
scientifique, un grain de subjectivité peut avoir été Introduit pour mettre du poids
à quelques arguments ou pour provoquer délibérément le lecteur à réfléchir sur
le concept présenté.
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I. Introduction
This essay will attempt to venture into topics, which in the International
development sector are often considered taboos. At the least, to those of the
development sector, talk of efficiency increasing policies and commercialisation
immediately stimulâtes images of arbitrary budget cuts and increase
intervention. Much of the blâme for the quasi-traumatic reaction of the sector to
these terms is due to their inappropriate use, mostly by public development
agencies, to justify budgetary cutbacks. These terms in the public and private
sectors, in général, have become almost synonymous with closures and
retrenchments. The bad réputation of these terms has lead to the development,
especially in the private sector, of a sériés of euphemisms, e.g. re-engineering.
If it will help the reader keep a more objective perspective whiist going through
this essay, the euphemism 'professionalisation', (which was suggested to me
by someone of the development sector affected by the traumas of past calls for
greater efficiency), can be substituted in the place of the term
'commercialisation'.
AIso, the concept of privatisation, especially as a tool for development, may
arouse suspicion. The development sector in général can be said to have a
bias against the involvement of the private sector within the scope of
developmental aid. Although some may argue this last statement, few will
disagree that the use of the private sector as a tool within international
development co-operation has not been extensively investigated. Many within
the development sector have witness the privatisation efforts of the 1980's, and
not ail are convinced that positive économie and social benefits have resulted.
Most readers, I am sure, will receive the application of privatisation policies
within the developmental sector, with great résistance.
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The aim of this essay is net to propagate the absorption of developmental co
opération by the private sector but rather to attempt to pierce through the taboos of
the development sector in order to seek new alternatives that could help bring the
sector towards a higher level of effectiveness. Myself, having worked within
developmental co-operation efforts (DCE), share many of the same initial
hésitations that most readers will have towards the ideas investigated within this
essay. But, if the taboos and euphemisms are disregarded, it is possible to identify
scénarios and méthodologies, which may make commercialisation and
privatisation into effective developmental tools at the disposai of the sector for
application when the spécifies of the situations addressed, justify them.
Therefore, I ask the reader to go through this essay keeping an objective mind
towards the newer concepts that may be introduced. Because this is an essay and
not a thesis per se, there has been some subjectivity used on my part in an attempt
to add weight and/or purposely stimulate reactions to some ideas or arguments
which it présents. Some subjectivity and lack of referencing may aiso exist because
of the novelty of some concepts, which the essay introduces, especially when the
idea of privatisation is forwarded. The absence of literature in some areas has lead
me to my own extrapolations.
The essay is presented in three parts. The first part reviews the concept of
effectiveness through commercial efficiency and adapts it to suite the
developmental sector through the introduction of allocative and objective related
efficiency. With these adaptations, it relooks at the économie theory to introduce
why and how the DCEs should be/become more efficient. The second part reduces
the scope of the essay's investigation into the attainment of greater effectiveness of
DCEs through commercialisation, to the very spécifie concept of using privatisation
of DCEs, and yet more spécifie, associative privatisation of DCEs as a tool for
development. Because the concepts introduced in the second part of this essay
may seem very abstract to many readers, part three offers the reader a practical
example of an actual attempt, which was made prier to this essay, at the
associative privatisation of a DCE.
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I hope that this essay will stimulate further investigation into the concepts,
which it introduces in the overall objective of improving the global quality of life
through more effective and sustainable developmentai co-operation efforts.
PARTI
1.1 Background
"The overview of the last two décades of developmentai assistance is
bitter. Let's understand development in the sense of welfare
improvement, and satisfaction of essential needs. The bulk of the Third
World is today in a worse situation then twenty years ago. The officiai
aid agencies have failed in their attempt at developing and improving
the living standards of poor nations.
Even though international aide has been constantly increasing, the
poverty of the Third World worsens. In over fifty différent countries of
Africa and Latin America, the annual per capita income today is inferior
to what it was at the beginning of the decade. This sad observation
forces a requestioning of the effectiveness of international aid, and by
that, its capability to sustain development."^
The above quota is a rough translation of Myriam Donsimoni's comments
presented in the préfacé of her book "Du Don a L'Aide, Le IVlarché de
L'Altruisme". She supports her statement with data coming from a multitude of
international organisations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, GATT, and
others. Many other papers reflecting similar opinions and observations have
been written in the last decade. There are, of-course, contradicting views which
interpret differently the empirical data available. But it is hard to reject that the
overall quality of life of individuels in LCD countries has not increased
significantly in comparison with the amounts of development aide money and
effort which has been invested.
' Myriam Donsimoni, "Du Don à l'Aide, le marché de l'altruisme" Edition l'Harmattan ; (Paris, 1995)
p.ll
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This essay will not attempt to join the argument debating whether developmental
ald is effective or not, but rather will try to look at how the effectiveness of this ald
can be increased given the same inputs by improving the efficiency of the players
within development.
This essay was stimulated in large part by the flagrant inefficiencies which I have
witness during my time as an expatriate development worker. My observations at
that time were non-scientific, and may have been isolated to the spécifie projects
with which I was involved. Nevertheless, my involvement, later, with the private
sector in that same région clearly demonstrated that the inefficiencies présent
within the developmental sector were not universel throughout the region's
economy. A négative stereo type was associated with development workers within
the economy. This attitude was apparent with many private sector employers who
would not consider candidates, with work history within developmental
organisations, for job openings within their firms. Even worse than public sector
workers, developmental workers were seen as lazy and inefficient by most.
Why has this inefficiency crept into the workings of developmental NGOs, which for
some time were considered as dynamic alternatives to traditional governmental aid
agencies? In the 1980's, the success of the fieldwork done by developmental
NGOs became recognised by the public agencies. NGOs began to be used by
public finance as developmental vehicles. In fact, developmental NGOs are up until
now getting an increasing amount of financial support from national and
international public agencies. Public funds, for many developmental NGOs, have
become their core source of finance. Private funds collected from individuels now
often only serve to supplément the administrative opérations of the organisation
and assist in cases of urgencies. As aiso observed by M. Donsimoni, this évolution
within the finance of developmental NGOs has taken away their autonomy, and
'non-governmentar character. "Their dynamic and compétitive spirit in the search
for new finance has been bureaucratised transforming the light and flexible
structures of the organisations into heavy and rigid ones."^
^ Op. Cit., p.l4
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The relative importance of the contributions of public agencies within many
organisations bas given them an influential position over internai policies. This
outside influence was not présent when donations came from a variety of
private contributors, none individually significant enough to influence the
workings of the NGO. Development NGOs are now increasingly influenced by
external political pressures. The World Bank in its "Manual opérationnel d'une
collaboration avec les organisations non governementale" cited the
politicisation of NGOs as one of the main constraints blocking increase co
opération.^
1.2 Why Increase Efficiency ?
The answers to why the efficiency levels of the development co-operation
efforts (DCE) should be increased seem at first view to be obvious. But the
answer really dépends on the motives behind these efforts. If the motive is
simply to sustain an expatriate development industry, and benefit from the
diplomatie ties and bilatéral links which this effort may generate, then to waste
time and resources attempting to increase the efficiency of DCEs is
unwarranted. The simple presence of the DCEs within a certain economy,
coupled with a few well written annual reports camouflaging the inefficiencies
are sufficient to reach these motives. But if the motives are truly developmental
by the définition given above, then increase efficiency can only give positive
results.
The Member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAG) spend
about $60 billion dollars each year for officiai development assistance.'^ Their
three principal motivations for their efforts were described as such ;
^ World Bank Report, Manuel Opérationnel d'une Collaboration avec les Organisations Non-
Gouvernemental, World Bank ; 1995.
" Alistair Boulton, Aid Trade : Criticai
from the Canadian International Development Agency Internet site ; www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
 for Successful Development, Development Express, June 1995,
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The first motive Is fundamentally humanitarian. Support for
development is a compassionate response to the extreme poverty and
human suffering that still afflicts one-fifth of the world's population.
- The second reason for supporting development is enlightened self-
interest. Development benefits people not only in poor countries, but
aiso in the industrialised donor countries.
- The third reason for international support for development is the
solidarity of ail people with one another."
For the first two motives listed above, increase efficiency will make the
developmental efforts more effective. In-fact, the humanitarian motive fully justifies
the increase in efficiency since a more efficient PCE will be able to alleviate
poverty and human suffering more effectively than before. Or, at least, it will be
able to reach the same results at a lesser cost, leaving residual funds, which can
serve to finance further developmental efforts. The motive which is described as
"enlightened self-interest" aIso justifies an increase in efficiency levels, since the
increase in efficiency will aIso serve the egoistic motives of the donor countries by
maximising (or at least increasing) the benefits returned. As for the third motive,
"solidarity with ail people" is a concept that is broad and very difficult to quantify. A
simple diplomatie letter of regret or support can represent solidarity. In order to
judge the benefits of greater efficiency with regards to this motive, solidarity as a
concept would need to be further defined.
An increase in the efficiency levels of DCEs is needed if only to regain some of the
credibility which developmental aid has lost in the past decade. Economiste like
Gunner Myrdal and Dudiey Seers, who once favoured developmental aid, have
now changed their point of views in response to the poor performance of aid
programmes.® A PAC report published in the Canadien International Development
Agency (CIPA) newsletter, The Development Express, gave its description of the
présent performance of developmental aid ; "Set-backs have occurred, resources
have been wasted, and ill-conceived or poorly-managed, aid has even been
' Op. Cit.,
' As in "Les Pionniers du Développement" Economica, 1988, pl68
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counter-productive. Some countries have become excessively dépendent on aid."''
The report followed these comments by attempting to pick out what should be
learned from the mistakes of the past and suggested new fundamental policy
changes that are required to help reach the developmentai objectives. Their results
did touch on the need for greater efficiency and "professionalism" by the part of
DCEs. But, more Importantly, they recommended that future developmentai efforts
be stimulated, controlled and owed by the local populations that they aim to ald.
"Sustainable development, based on Integrated stratégies that incorporate key
économie, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned.'
We will come back on the importance of this statement and its relation to efficiency
further in this paper, but first let's return to are discussion on the need for increase
efficiency.
The budgets allocated to the developmentai agencies of Canada (GIDA) and the
USA (Usaid), entered a new era in 1995 when it was announced that
developmentai ald would face severe cuts and would become predominantly linked
to trade development in line with the DAC's second motive listed above. This is
well presented in a statement to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Représentatives in Washington, D.C. on May 9, 1995, by Mr Brian
Atwood, Administratorforthe U.S. Agency for International Development®,
"Cuts in U.S. assistance have the potentiel to trigger a chain reaction
of cuts from other donors to the most vulnérable nations.... America
would be sending a clear signal to the international community that
development was no longer a U.S. priority.... The reorganisation
proposai would likely add layers of unneeded bureaucracy to our
foreign affairs opérations, diminish U.S. flexibility in meeting pressing
foreign policy challenges and sacrifice long-term development to short-
term political gain. Everyone close to the issue has realised that
savings will only be obtained by slashing vital programs, not because
of any improvements in efficiency."
' Op.Cit, Alistair Boulton.
' Op.Cit,
' Statement to the Committee on international Relations of the House of Représentatives in
Washington, D.C. on li^ay 9, 1995, by Mr. Brian Atwood, Administrator for the U.S. Agency for
International Development as found in the Canadian International Development Agency Virtual
Library at Internet site : www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/
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Important cuts were made to several projects/programmes as a reshuffle in the
distribution of aid was initiated. This means that many DCEs falling under the
DAC's first motive who have, or may, face budgetary cuts need to adapt their
opérations. They need to increase the value added of every dollar coming from
their diminishing grants through higher efficiency in order to, at least, maintain
their prier effectiveness. "A growing portion of available ODA resources has
been devoted to humanitarian needs and debt relief in recent years, placing an
even greater strain on aid budgets", (DAC, 1996).
The DAC expressed its worry about the négative results that the new
development stratégies, which several of its member countries have adopted,
will have on the aiready deteriorating image and effectiveness of international
co-operation.
"It is clearthat an effort to build stronger compacts with developing countries on
a foundation of shrinking resources and declining commitment will lack
credibility. Therefore, it is necessary to express our deep concern that domestic
préoccupation and budgetary pressures in some Member countries seriousiy
jeopardise the international co-operation effort at a critical juncture."^°
1.3 Modélisation of the Donor-DGE Reiationship
Myriam Donsimoni, in her analysis of the économies of altruism, leads us into
another reasoning to justify the need for greater efficiency within DCEs. She
modelled the relations between donor and DCE by using duopolistic game
théories. Although her aims were différent from those of this paper, her
methodology can be adapted to serve our needs. The basic conclusion which
we can dérivé from her methodology is that ; A knowledgeable donor who
wants to maximises the utility of his/her donation will choose a DCE which
allocates the highest percentage of the donation towards actual developmental
efforts, assuming that the effectiveness of the DCE according to the donor is
essentially measured quantitatively."
'"Op.Cit, DAC.
" Op.Cit, Myriam Donsimoni, p.50, The true motivations behind donations are most likely far more
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To the donor, the donation, or the satisfaction gained by the donation, is a
product that is purchases at the price equal to the amount of the donation. As a
rationai consumer, the donor will want to maximise the satisfaction, or utility,
which can be extracted from his/her donation. He/she will choose the value of
his/her donation according to his/her maximum utility equilibrium that can be
reached given a fixed budget. If the donation is too small, utility will not be
maximised since the feeling of not having done enough for development will
remain and the motives behind the donation will not be fully achieved, the
feeling of guilt. Similarly, if the donation is too large, utility will be lost by the
superfluous income foregone by way of the donation, which would have been
better utilised elsewhere, the feeling of regret for having given too much.
Therefore, if the donor reaches a maximum utility point at a spécifie donation
amount, he/she will choose that amount for the donation, which will be given to
a DCE. This can be illustrated by a simple utility graph as found in figure#1
where "p" Is the equilibrium amount which the donor "D" is willing to donate to
the DCE "G" according to budgetary constraint "Y" and the utility curve "U". At
point "S", D did not give enough, and at point "T", D gave too much, therefore
both points fall on a lower utility curve. Point "p" is the highest utility curve
reachable given the budgetary constraint "Y".
Figure
a
_ — ' -U
complex than the given donor utility fonction suggests.
Op.Cit, p.55
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The Donor's Utility
Now that the donor has decided upon the amount of his/her donation, he/she
must now choose to which organisation or DCE he/she will make the donation.
To make this choice the donor will use the following utility function :
Ud(Y-p,x) Dp <0, Dx>0
Where Y corresponds to the donor's available budget ; p corresponds to the
amount of the donation made to the developmentai organisation ("C"), therefore
p is the donation from D to C ; x is the amount received by the less developed
countries, the populations aided ("A"), therefore x is the donation from C to A.
D's motivation in this model will be represented by x. Udi is the utility which d
gets from Y-p, and Ud2 is the utility from x. Therefore we get ;
Ud(Y-p,x) = Udi(Y-p) + Ud2(x)
The Developmentai Organisation's Utility
C's utility function is represented by :
Uc(p-x,x) Cp>0 C(p-x) >0, Cx>0
p-x corresponds to the amount kept by C to cover its operating costs. Uci is the
egoistic utility that C gets from p-x. Uc2 is the utility which C gets from x, since
after ail C would not exist if it was not to serve x and therefore we can assume
that C has an altruistic utility in x. Therefore :
Uc(p-x,x) = Uci(p-x) + Uc2(x)
The particularity with this situation is that x acts as an ambiguist variable for the
utility of C. A high level of x diminishes the utility gained from Uci(p-x), but
increases the utility gained from Uc2(x). The preferred amount for x will dépend
on the weights that C allocates to Uci(p-x) and Uc2(x).
10
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But D's utility is aiso influenced by C's choice for x. And since the choice of x
can ultimately affect D's choice of p, both C and D wlll need to agree on a level
of X which wlll maximise both player's utility. This brings us into the use of
game théories to décidé the optimum level of x.
fyis Donsimoni illustrated several models using the Cournot-Nash and
Stackelberg approaches. We wlll skip these as they are not very relevant to the
objectives of this paper and go straight to her conclusive model.
The Deveiopmental Organisation
D will décidé to give p if C promises to give x. D therefore defines p as a
fonction of x : p = p*(x). C will therefore maximise its utility fonction, Uc, under
the constraint : p = p*(x). C's new utility fonction is :
Uc(p*(x)-x,x)
C must détermine the value of x as a fonction of p which is itself a fonction of x :
^(P('))- This means that C takes D's reaction into considération.
The Donor
0 décidés to give x if D promises to give p. 0 chooses x as a fonction of p. This
means that the value of x will be determined by the value of p. x becomes a
fonction of p : * = x*(p). D will maximise Ud under the constraint x=x*(p). Its
new utility fonction will be :
Ud(Y-p,x(p))
D will therefore choose p as a fonction of x that is preferred by 0. D will take
C's reaction into account in its décision for p.
11
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Figure #2
Oo' ///  /
TC P.
c C-t,
ilJ ><f Uc
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The assumptions for figure #2 are :p>x& y>p.ltis reasonable to assume
that the developmental organisation will not give more than it receives and
similarly that the donor will not donate an amount superior to his/her budget.
Therefore our area of analysis on the figure is restricted by the axis
representing "p" at the bottom, by the linear p = x at the top, and by the
budgetary constraint of D, (Y).
The linear x*(p) is the reaction function of C ; it corresponds to the rate of
transformation of the donation into aid., (p to x). It links C's preferred values of
X. D's reaction curve is : p*{x). This corresponds to the rate of change of aid
into additional donations. It links the points preferred by the donor, D. We
assume that the donor prefers a situation where ail of his donation is used as
aid, p = X.
D will want to maximise x for A, the receiver of aid, through the efficient use of p
by C. Since there are no intersection between x*(p) & p = x other than at the
origin, which would mean that no donation would take place, a contract of
confidence must be made between D & C within which each player must bend
to the conditions of the other.
The linear x® in figure #2 shows the points of tangency of the utility curves Ud &
Uc :
MaxUo such that Uc = Ud
MaxUc such that Uc = Ud
X® forms the contract curve between D & C. Given a negotiation, the value of x
will aiways fall on linear x®, x = x®. This is because linear x® offers the optimum
situation for x where no player, D or G, have any interest in changing the value
of X. At this optimum it is impossible to increase the utility of a player without
correlatively reducing that of the other ;
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Max x,p Ud(Y-p,x) such that : Uc(p-x,x) > Uc
We can interpret this resuit by using the Lagrangian Function
J = Ud(Y'P,x) + X[Uc(p-x,x) ' Uc]
Through the differentiatlon of this function we can détermine the configuration
of the contract curve x® keeping the foilowing constraints in mind :
• X® does not pass through the origin since Ud is horizontal and Uc is vertical
at that point. The two utility curves are not tangent at point 0. x® is therefore
aiways situated above the point of origin.
• Ud is vertical towards the constraint Y and Uc is vertical when it intersects
x*(p). Therefore Ud and Uc are tangent at the point of intersection of Y and
x*(p).
• The intersection of x® and p = x, point Q, is aiways inferior than the intercept
of X® and Y, point R : Q < R. This means that D would not accept to increase
his/her donation, p, knowing that by doing so x will be reduced.
The distance between linear x® and x*(p) can be interpreted as the confidence
constraint. The more confident D is in C, the greater the donation, p. This is
represented by the diminishing distance between x® and x*{p) as p increases.
At the same time D will allow x to approach x*(p), leaving C with a greater
amount of p-x.
We will now leave Ms Donsimoni's model to answer our question : Why should
DCEs increase their levels of efficiency?. The DCE, "C", should increase its
level of efficiency because by doing so it will diminish its necessity for p-x
which will lessen the weight allocated to this preference in its utility function :
Uc(p-x,x). This can be translated in our figure by an increase in the slope of
linear x*{p) as shown in figure #3. The increase in the slope of x*(p) will
" Op.Cit, p.94
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diminish the confidence constraint area between x® and x (p) and theretore as
was previousiy demonstrated, D wlll be stimuiated to give a larger amount of p
given D's utility function : Ud(Y-p,x). In return, C wlll dérivé a larger utility
coming from the increase in p and from the larger amount of x, which A
reçoives.
14
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Il is important to add a note to this model, which, although is theoretically founded, may not well
represent the real world situation. This is mostly due to possible observable différence in the décisions of
the donors as compared to the utility function UD(Y-p,x) that we have given them. We can speculate that
some factors, such as DCE marketing and/or fiscal policies, play significant rôles in the décision process
of the donor. Furthermore, the benefits from increase efficiency, for some DCEs, may be insignificant
due to the relative insignificance of private donations as compared to those coming from public sources.
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1.4 Methods of increasing Efficiency
"Privatisation will increase efficiency: 'Nationalisation of spontaneous
change which compétition and fear of bankruptcy impose upon the
private sector.' (Sir Keith Joseph, 1980)"^®
A paraliel can be made between the situation that the aid sector is now facing
and that which the public sector of most western nations faced a decade ago.
As a resuit, the decade of the 1980's saw in the developed countries a wave of
dénationalisation of public enterprise. Faced with growing dissatisfaction over
the bureaucratie size and operative inefficiencies contributing to the high costs
of the public sector, western governments entered a privatisation frenzy. The
World Bank in a report published in 1981 emphasised the need for reform of
the private sectors of many économies, which it described with the following
words :
" It is now widely évident that the public sector is over-extended, given
the présent scarcities of financial resources, skilled manpower, and
organisational capacity. This has resulted in slower growth than might
have been achieved with available resources, and accounts for the
présent crisis."^®
Although Chile in the late 1970's was one of the first nations to adopt a
disinvesture policy, the success of British privatisation programme is largely
considered responsible for having fuelled a wave of public sector disinvestures
around the world. Economist and policy makers from other western nations
studied the British experience at length. Copies and variants of the British
strategy were implemented in other countries, although not aiways with similar
results.^^
" Sir Keith Joseph, 1980, as found in ; V.V. Ratnanadham, Privatisation : The UKExperience and
Developing Countries, Oxford, 1996, p. 14
World Bank (1981) Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action.
Washington DC: World Bank.
" Op.Cit., V.V.Rainanadham, p. 21
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The argumGnts us0d by the British to rally support for their privatisation policies is
best portrayed in the British White Paper on privatisation put to pariiament in 1986
priorto Britain's second privatisation phase. These arguments could aiso very well
be used to argue for the privatisation of the aid sector as its massage seems as
vaiid for the aid sector as it was for the public sector.^®
"The Government believes that privatisation of public enterprises will benefit their
customers and employées, and indeed the nation as a whole, in the following
ways;
I) The enterprises will be free of Government intervention in day to day
management and protected from fluctuating political pressures."
As was mentioned previousiy, political interférence within DCEs is one of the major
concerns of the World Bank. Although a great deal of expertise is transferred from
public aid agencies to the DCEs, the bureaucracies imposed by these agencies
upon the DCEs in the name of good control and co-ordination often give
nightmares to DCE managers. The DCE workers often have a much clearer view of
the appropriate actions to take relative to a civil servant often several océans away.
"il) The enterprises will be released from the constraints on financing which public
ownership imposes."
Dependence on annual budgets or three year plans, by DCEs, make it difficult for
them to have any sort of médium term objectives, and therefore security. It is aIso
very difficult for DCE managers to ally cost recovery policies with budget-based
financial management. The timely and painstaking bureaucratie redtape, often
necessary for the release of founds for DCEs, is a source of major inefficiency
within the aid sector.
' As argued in a White Paper: (Cmnd 9734, HMSO, London, 1986)
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"iii) Access to private capital markets will make it easier for the enterprises to
pursue effective investment stratégies for cutting costs and improving
standards of service."
It is impossible for a DCE, as a non-commercial entity, to be active in the
financial markets. Either for the purpose of sourcing termed finance, or for the
purpose of investing available reserves or savings.
"iv) The financial markets will be able to compare the performance of individuel
enterprises against each other and against other sectors of the economy. This
will provide the financial spurto improve performance."
This is aiso applicable to DCEs. A privatised DCE will need to compete with the
rest of the private sector for available finance forcing efficiency and good
financial management.
"v) A System of économie régulation will be designed to ensure that the benefits
of greater efficiency are systematically passed on to customers in the form of
lower prices and better services than would otherwise have occurred. vi)
Private enterprises will have a greater incentive to ascertain the needs and
preferences of customers, and to tailor their services and tariffs accordingly.
vii) Private enterprises will be better able to compete in the provision of various
commercial services, notably in consultancy abroad."
Economie régulations, in the case of privatised DCEs, would dépend on the
conditions spécifie to each DCE. Orientation councils can be set up to offer
guidance to the newiy privatised DCE. As for the gains to the customer,
experience with the commercialisation of DCEs active in the dissémination of
appropriate technologies for small scale business development in eastern and
southern Africa demonstrated that a commercial DCE could provide a much
better customer service than before.
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Distribution policies within the commercialised DCE were improved giving the
customer better access to the DCE's products, spare parts and repair facilities.
Better promotionai and informational efforts were undertaken, giving the market
greater knowiedge of the benefits they couid dérivé from the products. More
information was aiso avaiiabie to the purchasers of the products about the
maintenance and mode of opération of their purchases. The quaiity of the
products was improved and adapted to customer needs. The introduction of
mass manufacturing, possible through the development of export markets,
increased the margins avaiiabie to the DCE whiist at the same time diminished
the cost to the customers of the established market. (see Part III of this paper)
A wealth of expertise has been cultivated within many DCEs. This expertise
can be commercialised by DCEs and exploited to the profit of the privatised
DCE.
"viii) Privatised enterprises will be better able to attract high quaiity managers
from other parts of the sector."
As previousiy mentioned, within some économies, the stéréotypé
accompanying the development worker and the lack of récognition given for
work done within DCEs has made it difficult for DCEs to attract high quaiity
managers, even when higher wages are offered. The privatised DCE would
enter the private sector and compete at the same level as ail other private
companies. Its association with the traditional development organisation, other
than through historical reference and possible allocative aims, would no longer
exist. As a dynamic private enterprise, the stigma attached to working for a
DCE would disappear.
"ix) There will be opportunity for wide ownership of local shares both among
employées and among local customers.
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x) Most employées will be more closely Involved with their business through
their ownership of shares, and motivated to ensure Its success."
Ownership of the newiy privatised DCE could be offered to Its staff encouraging
an even greater increase in efficiency levels. The local public could aiso
participate in the ownership that could help sensitise the local populations to
their own deveiopmentai needs and allow them to take it into their command.
We will come back to this topic in tare greater détails later in this paper.
Pure privatisation, though, is not atways suited to the objectives of many DCEs.
The lack of a marketable product would prevent many DCEs of reaching
viability as a private enterprise. A solution for some DCEs in this situation
would be to form private companies that would tender for deveiopmentai
contracte from their new clients, the aid agencies. This solution would need to
be studied further, as it could create a monopsony situation, which may not be
the preferred scénario if effectiveness through increase efficiency is the
ultimate objective.
Similarly, those DCEs which do produce marketable products, services or
expertise may not necessarily aiways reach higher levels of efficiency through
privatisation. It is not the ownership structure that is the catalyst for efficiency
but rather the compétitive conditions, which are often introduced through
privatisation. If it is possible to recreate a compétitive atmosphère within a non-
privatised DCE than the benefits from higher efficiency levels may be reached
without the burden of privatisation. Colin Kirkpatrick made the same
observation in his paoer Backaround Observations on Privatisation:
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"It would be purposeful for developing countries ta note that several
changes in productive efficiency, which have occurred after
privatisation, did not in tact need privatisation as a pre-condition
The lesson is therefore, that a developing country does not have to
assume that every désirable step in marketisation is only possible
through divestiture. Conversely, privatisation will not automatically
bring about ail désirable marketing changes."^®
A privatisation "fad" must be avoided, and every DCE must be analysed
separately to judge if privatisation is the right vehicle to stimulate the right
variables and market forces that would bring the DCE to higher efficiency levels
and greater effectiveness. The World Bank and many public aid agencies have
been blamed for pressuring LDC countries to jump onto the "privatisation
bandwagon" for ail the wrong reasons. David Heal in 1988 in his analysis of the
ideological history of public aid agencies said, "at présent there seems to be a
striking combination of aggressive ideology and of what, if taken at face value,
can only be described as naive managerialism. Fashions change and there is a
certain irony in the aid agencies' current advocacy of dénationalisation for the
public sector enterprise which they were instrumental in establishing
We must distinguish the variance between commercialisation, which is the
introduction of policies and measures which increase the presence of market
forces within an enterprise or organisation, and privatisation which implies the
concession of ownership to private interests. Although often seen
complimentarily, these two conditions are in no way interdependent. The
presence or introduction of one policy within an enterprise does not necessarily
advocate for the introduction of the other. It would be correct to say that
commercialisation is a policy vehicle to reach the ultimate goal of greater
effectiveness through increase efficiency and that privatisation is simply a tool
that can be used within the commercialisation policy.
" Colin Kirkpatrick, Background Observations on Privatisation, London 1996, p.5
^ David Heath, Privatisation : Modalities and Strategy, London 1996, p.l20
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There is a range of commercialisation opportunities in terms of the degree of
ownership, control, management or opérations which is foregone, in our case,
by tfie public aid agencies or donors. First, commercialisation can operate at
many levels. The lowest forms of commercialisation may involve no more than
introducing good business practice through the engagement of a manager or a
consultant from the private sector. Only a slightiy higher level might involve
minor opérations being undertaken by the private sector. Introduction of
operative and administrative Systems based on efficient attainment of
performance targets is another level of commercialisation, which can often
stimulate important increases in effectiveness within organisations. At the
extreme, the highest level of commercialisation is privatisation where 100 per
cent of the equity in an enterprise is sold to private sector purchasers with no
spécial powers over it being retained by the donor.
1.5 Economie Justification
No econometric case studies nor économie theory has yet offered a clear-cut
statement that privatisation of the public sector will aiways increase efficiency
(Bôs,1997)^\ In fact, more recent économie papers tend to stray from this
widely held view promoted in the last decade. Contrary cases have been
presented (Whitfield, 1992 ; Shapiro and Willig, 1990). Although these may
only offer exceptions to the ruie, the fondamental criterion of measure is
efficiency. In the past, the emphasis had been put on productive efficiency
measurable through the use of a production fonction which analysed the ratio
of inputs to outputs, which, for the private sector, often takes profit as a highiy
weighted variable. More recently, économiste have analysed the merits of
privatisation through the use of an alternative type of efficiency, allocative
efficiency. Allocative efficiency is of major importance to our analysis of the
privatisation of DCEs since, very often, developmental efforts do not have profit
maximising aims. It can be well argued that privatisation increases productive
Dicter Bôs, An Alternative to Privatisation: Coping with Managerial Slack in Public Firms,
Bonn, 1997.
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efficienoy, but distorts allocative efficiency. Whether privatisation is to be
reoontmended for developmentai oo-operation efforts dépends on the welghts
allocated to these countervailing eftects.
We can illustrate the trade-ofts necessary when contemplating such a décision
by using a simple utility curve model.^ Consider the privatisation of a DCE that
offers a product or service to a developing market under monopolisée
conditions where privatisation improves X^efficiency (productive-efficiency) but
distorts allocative efficiency. For a basic two-product/service DCE, Figure 4
présents the production-possibility frontier for the output quantities x1 and x2.
We assume that this frontier is not changed by the DOE's shift to pnvate
ownership. However, the private DCE will need to change its policies, namely
its production an'^ managerial policies towards cost recovery objectives, if it is
to survive. This is illustrated in figure 4 by having différent production points for
the privatised and non-privatised DCE under the same input levels. We
imagine a privatised DCE which has attained full productive efficiency at point
A. Since the privatised DCE now applies profit maximisation policies it will
produce at a point far from point B which is where its X-efficient production aiso
maximises allocative efficiency and therefore the optimum possible welfare
point is reached. Point B meets the highest welfare-curve, W1, which can be
attained given the production possibilities of the DCE. We can compare the
privatised DCE with two kinds of non-privatised DCE : a rather well-run DCE
which produces at point C and a relatively badiy-run DCE which produced at
point D.
" *(Used here to analyse the merits ofprivatisation of developmentai coopération efforts on
public enterprise analysis published by Bôs-1997. Laffort and Tirole-1991, and Shapiro and Wilhg-
1990
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The illustration demonstrates the trade-off between allocative efficiency and X-
efficiency : if the DCE is well run and produces at C, it should not be privatised.
A move from C to A implies a détérioration of allocative efficiency which is so
serious that it is not offset by the simultaneous improvement of X-efficiency. On
the other hand, if the DCE is badiy run and produces at D, it should be
privatised. The move from D to A is welfare improving : it is worthwhile to
accept the allocative distortion created by the privatisation because it is
coupled with an immense increase in X-efficiency.
The above model greatly copies the model developed by Bôs in 1997 where he
offered a compromise between recent papers recommending privatisation for
public enterprises (namely Laffont and Tirole - 1991) and others advising
against (namely Shapiro and Willig - 1990).^^
Because of the nature of DCEs it can be expected that a heavy weight will be
put on the allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency can be represented by a
straight line set at a 45® angle from the origin as found in figure 5 (we assume
here that the output quantities XI and X2 will be scaled along both axis
according to équivalent product/service preference). The importance of
allocative efficiency to the DCEs will be reflected on our welfare curve by
diminishing its concavity necessitating far greater X-efficiency improvements
during privatisation to warrant any allocative efficiency loss in the process.
By extrapolating a little, we can imagine that some DCE carry weights to
allocative efficiency which are infinitely large and do not allow any déviation
from the allocative efficiency line. In these cases privatisation is a non-starter
since no gains in X efficiency could suffice. We will discuss further in this paper
" Laffont, J.J., and J. Tirole, Privatisation and Incentives, Journal of Law, Economies, and
Organization, 1991,7: 84-105 : Shapiro, C., and R.D. Willig, Economie Rationales for the Scopc of
Privatisation, 1990, pp. 55-87.
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the types of DCEs which are net suitable for privatisation and which are,
basically which have relatively heavy allocative efficiency weights as compared
to X-efficiency and which put less relative importance on allocative efficiency.
For those DCEs which cannot gain from privatisation (points G in figure 4 and
points C&D in figure 5), but who are below the optimum welfare point B, welfare
improvements can be introduced by undertaking commercialisation policies.
These internai X- and allocative efficiency improvement policies can help the
□CE reach higher welfare levels given the same inputs. Within our model,
movement from points G and D towards point B on the figures 4 and 5 can
illustrate commercialisation. We will discuss the concept and methodology of
commercialisation of DGEs further in this paper. For now we will focus on the
économies behind the privatisation and commercialisation of DGEs.
in 1996, during the international conférence on privatisation held in Budapest,
Dieter Bôs presented économie models that analysed inefficiencies in public
firms and offered alternatives to privatisation as a way to counter these
inefficiencies. Although this paper will not attempt to accept or reject the
concept of privatisation on the same grounds as Bôs, I will borrow and apply
his methodology to represent a décision process leading to commercialisation
and/or privatisation efforts within DGEs.^'^
Bôs identified managerial slack as the main form of non-technical inefficiency.
He used a very général concept of managerial slack, which he proposes can be
eliminated within public enterprises in order to reach optimum welfare levels
without having to privatise. This simplified concept of managerial slack gives
extreme indépendance and responsibility to the manager(s) of a DGE.
Managerial slack is held responsible for non-technical inefficiencies.
^ Dicter Bôs, Extract from contributions to the discussions at the Budapest International Conférence on
Privatisation, as found in Patrick Plane, Privatisation and Economie Growth, New York, 1997.
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ril briefly go through a model which represents the particularities of a DCE
under monopolistic conditions, (as this paper will elaborate later, the use of
monopolistic models to represent DCEs is warranted by the diseconomies
caused by their existence within compétitive markets). The purpose of this
présentation is simply to demonstrate mathematically the workings of non-
technical inefficiencies within DCE's. This will give the reader a basic idea of
where one could start to develop more complicated models adapted to the
spécifie microeconomic environment of a considered DCE in order to formulate
practical policy décisions.
I. The Model
A DCE, its Management, and the Donor (if multiple donors exist, they are
assumed to hold the same objectives and act as one entity)
The model deals with a one-good monopolistic DCE that opérâtes in the
following framework. It faces a demand fonction
* = x(p); Xp < 0,
where x is the quantity that is negatively correlated to the price represented by
p. The market is aiways cleared, hence x is both the demanded and supplied
quantity. The cost fonction representing the DCE for the supply of x is
C = C(x,e); Cx >0, Ce < 0,
where e is effort of the manager. Cost is positively related to quantity and
negatively correlated to effort. The costs may aiso dépend on a random
variable 0 making
C = C(x,e,Q),
The manager, (although we use the singular form for simplicity, the model can
be expanded to globally represent ail managers and professionals of a DCE),
has a concave utility fonction which is positively related to his/her income, I,
and negatively to his/her effort.
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V=V(!,e); Vi>0, Ve<0
The manager's income, !, is meant to represent the entire compensation
package given to the Manager. It Includes saiary and "perks".
FInaliy, as a général notation of any Donor objective fonction, we choose
Q. = Q(p,e,Q).
An important assumption is made here being that the objective fonction is
measored in monetary onits. Hence if Q is a welfare objective as woold be the
case for most DCEs, the ose of a money metric of social otility is reqoired. This
may become a very constraining assomption with certain types of DCE. We
aiso assome that both Donor and manager are risk neotral. Managers are
assomed to only find motivation from !.
II. Informatlonal Setting
When the Donor and the manager negotiate the compensation for the
manager's effort, both can plan only in terms of expected otility and welfare. As
income is a measore of compensation for effort which in itself cannot be
independently qoantified, another qoantifiable variable (variable 0) which
enters both the donor's and the DCE's fonction is needed to isolate e. Variable
0 is then brooght into the manager's otility fonction and becomes the common
variable opon which compensation for effort can be agreed to in an
employment contract. Only after entering employment can the manager
observe the actoal valoe of 0. He then sets p and e according to 0 and thereby
maximises his/her personal otility. After prodoction, the donor is able to
observe price, ootpot, and effort and to compensate the manager accordingly.
In other words the donor and manager agree on a qoantifiable variable which is
représentative of the manager's effort towards the donors objectives. This
qoantifiable variable will become the indicator osed to compensate the
manager's effort based on the level of soccess of the manager in attaining the
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donor's objectives. This Incentive compensation or "commission" wlll represent
the manager's Income.
The manager, we assume, wants to maximise his/her utiilty and therefore wlll
maximise hIs/her level of effort applled towards the objectives of the donor so
as to. In return, maximise hIs/her Income. The donor can only rely on the
selfishness of the manager by taking account of hIs/her utIIlty maximisatlon.
The manager's participation Is achleved If he/she can at least expect to reach
hIs/her réservation utIIlty, Q, otherwise he/she wlll not accept the job, (the
manager's participation constraint).
EV(!,e,Q) 3 0
where E Is the expectatlon operator with respect to 0. The manager's utIIlty wlll
dépend on 9, because both commission and effort wlll dépend on 0.
III. Defining Efficlency
Consider a fully Informed developmental planner who maximises a social
benefit cost différence subject to the fully Informed manager's participation
constraint. The optimisation problem can be described by the followlng
Lagrangean fonction (Bôs, 1997):
J = S(p) + px(p) ' C(x(p),e) -î-XiV(l,e) - 0\,
where S(p) Is consumer surplus, ÔS/ôp = -x(p). DIfferentlating wIth respect to p
ylelds the marginal-cost pricing ruie that Implles allocative efficlency:
(p - Cx)xp = 0.
By differentlating wIth respect to e and I, (Followlng a serles of manipulations
demonstrated by Bôs, 1997) we getthe X-effIciency ruIe (Gravelle, 1982)
Ve/\/! = Ce
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This is because -VeA/i =: MRS(e,!) is the marginal rate of substitution between
income and effort. The marginal rate of substitution is equated to a marginal
rate of transformation, as defined along the cost function, -Ce/Ci =: MRT(e,!),
where we have defined Ci := 1.
We now introduce the donor's objective function Q according to a fully-
informed donor who maximises the following Lagrangian function:
j: = i^(p.e)-!-X[V(l,e)-(h.
Differentiation with respect to p yields
Qp = 0.
This marginal condition will not imply allocative efficiency uniess the donor
maximises welfare. Differentiation with respect to ! and e yields
VeA/i = -Qe.
As we have seen before with the X-efficiency ruie, if this condition holds, there
is no managerial slack in the achievement of the objective Q.
What this shows is that, in a DCE, managerial slack means inefficient
achievement of a particular donor objective. In this respect, pure production
considération may not be prédominant if the donor is interested in maximising
non-profit or welfare oriented objectives.
To prevent getting bogged down with assumptions and détail, we will leave our
model at this stage so that it can become a base model which can be used to
formulate more complex models demonstrating non-technical inefficiencies
within DCE's and ways to eliminate it. Bôs in his présentation expanded his
version of this model further to analyse différent ways of using performance
incentives to eliminate managerial slack within public enterprise. For the
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purpose of this paper it is best to interpret managerial slack as non-productive
inefficiency. The modal presented above therefore offer us a base upon whloh
policy measures can be adopted wlthin DCEs to ellminate or reduce
inefficiencies without necessarily resorting to privatisation policies. This is
especially important forthose DCEs, which, as covered previousiy, have almost
exclusively allocative efficiency objectives, and where the benefits from X-
efficiency improvements brought about by privatisation couid never
compensate for the simultaneous allocative efficiency losses.
1.6 Concluding Part I
This first part of the essay attempted to présent a perspective of efficiency
within DCEs that is compatible with their developmentai aims. We began by
covering the reasoning behind targeting efficiency improvements to improve the
effectiveness of DCEs. We saw that the motives behind the formation of the
DCE are an important considération to judge whether efficiency can
appropriately improve effectiveness. An increase in the efficiency of DCEs is
justified by the need to regain loss credibility experienced in the past decade
by the developmentai aid sector. Diminishing public allocations to international
aid as a proportion of national production aiso calls for increase efficiency as
DCEs need to increase the value added of every dollar coming from their
diminishing grants in order to, at-least, maintain their prior effectiveness. We
aIso presented an économie model that attempts to show that DCEs could
benefit from increasing its efficiency through increased levels of private
donations stimulated by greater confidence in DCE effectiveness.
We then followed by identifying methods of increasing efficiency. An important
distinction was made between X-efficiency (production) improvements and
allocative efficiency improvements. We acknowledged that most DCEs would
benefit more from policies aimed at improving the latter type of efficiency. We
aIso differentiated budgetary efficiency against objective efficiency and
explained that due to the social missions of most DCEs, objective efficiency
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was to be used as our target. In fact, we argued that budgetary efficlency
préoccupation, often used In the past, can actually be detrimental to the
effectiveness of the DCE.
At this point we argued that the efficlency of DCEs could be greatly improved
through the introduction or simulation of market forces within them. To do this
the concept of commercialisation for DCEs was presented.
One of several techniques for introducing market forces within a DCE, and one
that is at the extreme amongst the différent levels of commercialisation, is that
of privatisation. The next part of this essay will focus solely on this extreme
scénario, when and how it should be applied. We abandon the balance of the
scope on the commercialisation of DCE at this point, not because it is of no
interest but because its extent goes far beyond the reaches of a simple essay.
PART II
2.1 Introduction
In this section I will concentrate on the privatisation of DCEs. As it was
mentioned previousiy, not ail DCEs are suitable for privatisation. In fact only a
minority of DCE objectives can more effectively be reached through
privatisation. But for those DCEs that are suitable for privatisation, the benefits
from privatisation on efficlency and ultimately the effectiveness of the DCE in
reaching its goals can be considérable given a carefully co-ordinated transition
phase.
We will look at the types of DCEs suitable for privatisation and follow by
illustrating examples of DCEs, which not only can, but should, be privatised.
We will then parallel with the privatisation théories used for the public sector to
try to briefly give "how to" pointers. Finally, we will expand on the use of
associative ownership models as the format which the DCE's privatisation effort
should/could take.
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This entire section will ba closely linked to privatisation theory and literature for
public sector enterprises. We are forced to this comparison, due to the
absence of literature on the privatisation of DCEs. I have taken care in
adapting the public enterprise théories to suite the spécifications of DCEs. As
this is only a brief représentation in essay format, it should not be judge too
severely but rather should help stimulate, it is hoped, a more profound debate
on the subject.
2.2 Which can be privatised ?
Two main prerequisites are necessary for a DOE to be considered for
privatisation. The first of these is the presence of a viably marketable product,
service and /or expertise, which the DOE can market in line with its
developmental objectives. The absence of such a product or service would
make it impossible for the privatised DOE to generate the necessary cost
recovery revenues. AH DCEs, although it may not aiways be so apparent at
first, have a product, service or expertise, which it can market. Without one, the
DCE would not have a purpose nor any real reason to exist and therefore
should be terminated altogether. The DCE that is helping to build a school is
producing a product, is offering a service and if it provides the teacher upon
completion is sharing an expertise. Often the problem with DCEs is not the
existence of a good to market but rather the existence of a suitable market to
which the good can be viably commercialised, (not to be confused with our
previous use of the word commercialise. Here we are referring to the marketing
rather than the management définition of the word). A DCE may have the
expertise necessary to build the best educational facilities but if the local
population, governments, international aid agencies or any other entity is
unwilling to purchase the good at a price which is at least cost recovery, then
the DCE is not viable as a private entity. Local governments and international
aid agencies must not be overlooked when trying to identify a source of
demand for the DCE's goods and services.
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The success of the commercialisation efforts required prior to the initiation of
any privatisation policy will often greatly affect the viability of the privatised
DCE. A product, service or expertise, which did not seem commercially viable
to the DCE can become profit generating once commercial Systems and
attitudes have been introduced to the DCE. Our previous example of a DCE
offering educational expertise may not have seen it viable to offer its expensive
expatriate trainers with travel and living expansés at a price which local
governments could afford. But once it has introduced some commercial policies
it may see opportunity in offering an equally qualified native trainer who can
work at locally compétitive wages and without ail the extra costs of a foreign
trainer, (this is just a simple example used to make our point. We must keep in
mind that we have assumed equal qualification and capabilities. It should aiso
be analysed in the commercialisation efforts weather the level of expertise used
prior to commercialisation is really necessary for the purpose of the DCE's
objectives).
Our second prerequisite for the success of a privatised DCE is found within the
composition of its overall objective. Inevitably the mission statement of ail
DCEs will be altered somewhat during any privatisation process. If the
objectives of a DCE are highiy allocative in nature, as was previousiy defined
and illustrated, the privatisation process risks altering too heavily the mission
statement of a DCE to a point where the original objectives will not be
appropriately met. Often within these DCEs, policies to introduce viability
correlatively affect the attainment of their objectives. We return to our example
of a DCE involved in building and administrating schools for low income
communities, if the DCE's main objective is to provide a school which will offer
an adéquate éducation to the community at a price which ail can afford within
the next year, then it is likely that efforts to turn the DCE into a viable private
enterprise will work against its objectives in one of two ways. Either the DCE
will introduce cost recovery measures which will increase the cost of the
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educational services by the amount previousiy subsidised by the DCE, making
It unaffordable for many In the community. Or the DCE wlll take the budgets of
the Individuals within the community into considération and will offer an inferior
educational standard in line with the revenues it expects to receive.
There is a third variable which, although not an essential prerequisite, can
greatly affect the viability of a privatised DCE. Many DCEs are dépendent on
very specialised expertise that is essential for the achievement of their
objectives. If this expertise is not internally présent in the DCE, the costs of
contracting out or hiring the expertise may jeopardise its viability. This
expertise often supplied by donor aid agencies, may not (should not) be
available to a privatised DCE.
2.3 Which should and should not be privatised ?
Deveiopmental Co-operation Efforts should be classified under four headings:^®
i) Those whose objectives have been achieved and should be discontinued.
il) Those whose fonctions could successfully be absorbed by local
organisations.
iii) Those whose fonctions would be more efficiently performed by the existing
private sector.
iv) Those whose fonctions can not be effectively undertaken by any other
existing commercial or non-commercial organisation.
Many DCEs today have outlived their usefui existence. They once followed a
clear objective, but along the way the original objective was either altered or it
was reached and new objectives were thought up to prolong its life. As
happens with many projects, which are conceived, they seem to have a life of
their own and refuse to die.
Op.Cit. John Heath, p. 123
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One important différence between a non-privatise DCE and its privatised
counter part is that wfien a DCE becomes private it stops being a project.
Projects by définition are finite entities. They are conceived for a spécifie
objective that is accompanied with a time scheduie. Of-course most DCEs
never reach their objectives in the time that they have aiiocated themseives
(demonstrating further their inefficiencies), but their purpose is nevertheiess
meant to be finite. As a private enterprise, the finaiity of the DCE ceases to
exist. This is why we previous made reference to the change in the mission
statement of a DCE during its privatisation process. A privatised DCE can ailow
itseif to have a broader set of objectives that are less time sensitive. Compared
to the objectives of our non-privatised DCE given earlier (schooi), the mission
statement of the same DCE following its privatisation couid become '1o provide
an adéquate éducation to the community at an adéquate price."
The DCEs which have outiived their objectives shouid be evaluated on an
individual basis to see weather to either discontinue their opérations or to
privatised them. AI! DCEs in this category, which do not show ciear potential for
viabiiity as a private enterprise, shouid be discontinued. Those who do show
signs of potential viabiiity shouid be evaluated with regards to their affect upon
the local markets. If the privatise DCE will create diseconomies within the
market it shouid not be privatised but rather shouid be discontinued. Examples
could be technological or compétitive advantages gained whiist under the
subsidised protection of a non-privatised DCE. In général, no non-privatised
DCE shouid offer compétition to any existing private enterprise within the
market. Any such DCE is in fact anti-developmental as it is creating
diseconomies and unfair compétition due to the subsidies, which it benefits
from, but that are not available to the rest of the market. This unfair compétition
can lead to the élimination of an entire local market share held in an industry,
and often in a very short space of time.
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One of the only occasions where it might be justlfied to privatise a DCE into an
aiready compétitive market is when it is believed that by doing so the standards
of the industry may be elevated. This is especially true in the case where the
industry was previousiy controlied by a monopoly. Only a privatised DCE may
be able to cross the barriers of entry of such an industry, forcing the existing
monopoly to compete, to the benefit of the consumers. It is important to
remember that once the DCE has been privatised, no further
deveiopmentai assistance, not offered to the rest of the industry, should
be given to the DCE. If the DCE is to fail, it will have done so at the command
of the market forces, and maybe should not have been privatised but
discontinued in the first place. This is an important point since donors and aid
agencies will be tempted to answer to calls of distress from the privatised DCE
facing bankruptcy. But it must be kept in mind that any intervention within the
DCE following its privatisation will only disrupt the compétitive market forces
and eliminate the efficiency benefits that the privatisation efforts were meant to
attain in the first place.
Many DCEs, which do not demonstrate a potential market viability, may fall
under our second category. Although less pertinent to our discussion, it is
important to stress that even with those DCEs that do not fit the privatisation
mould, much can be done and many alternatives routes exist to increase its
effectiveness. If it is believed that the objectives of a DCE can be carried eut by
local commercial or non-commercial organisations, weather governmental or
not, the foreign administered DCE should transfer the administration of its
opérations locally if genuine interest is demonstrated. The efficiency and
effectiveness of the DCE will most often benefit from such a transfer. This
thinking is in line with the new recommendations of the World Bank and the
DAC that call for the adoption of a more local-based developmental co-
operation effort.
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"One key lesson about development co-operation Is that donor-driven
initiatives rarely take root and that developing countries and their
people must be at the centre of any effective System... the objective
wouid be to strengthen local capacity to lead the co-ordination
process... In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to
do things for developing countries and their people, but with them. It
must be seen as a collaborative effort to help them increase their
capacities to do things forthemselves."(DAC, 1996)^®
Our third category of DCEs, which carry out fonction that, can possibly be
performed more efficiently by the existing private sector should not be
privatised. To this category we may add those DCEs whose fonctions are
duplicating those of the private sector. If it is believed that the existing private
sector can successfully carry out the objective held by the DCE, then a transfer
of Knowledge should take place between the DCE and ail potential players
within the market. It is important to include ail potential players in the market
since by excluding one or many the DCE would be creating a disequilibrium
within the market by giving certain players unfair compétitive advantage. This
transfer of Knowledge can take many forms from the publication of technical
data to the organisation of seminars and trainings. The transfer of Knowledge
should be a swift opération and should not drag on to become another
unproductive (non-effective) DCE in itself. Once the transfer of Knowledge is
believed to have successfully taken place, the DCE should be discontinued and
should no longer interfère within the market other than with the possible
additional transfers of Knowledge, which would raise the effectiveness of the
industry as a whole.
Granting developmental aid to DCEs within areas that the private sector can be
more or equally effective equates to a non-efficient management of donor
moneys. This same argument was held to justify the need to privatise much of
the private sector.
Op.Cit., Alistair Boulton
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" the scarce resources of the State government need not be invested in
areas of consumer market in which it would merely be doing what the
private sector is aiready doing much better The State will do well to
disinvest from such areas of public enterprises - before it has to do so
by sheer weight of persistent and accumulated losses. Such
investment does not, in any case, stand any test of socio-economic
justification."
In the above argument, if the State Government would be replaced by the
Donor and the public enterprise by the DCE, the argument would still hold. One
important exception exists, though, and it is that DCEs are not subject to market
pressures such as some public sector organisations are. "Persistent and
accumulated losses" would have little influence on the existence of the DCE
since for the most part DCEs are fully subsidised and operate on non-cost
recovery budgetary accounting.
Falling in our last category are ail DCEs with potential commercial viability and
whose objectives and fonction are not aiready présent within the targeted
economy. For these DCEs no commercial enterprise is believed to be able to
successfully carry out their fonctions. These DCEs are the most suitable
candidates for privatisation. Through privatisation they will not only be more
likely to become more efficient and gain effectiveness but will aiso fill a void in
the targeted economy's market.
Eventhough the privatised DCE will often enter the market benefiting from
monopolistic conditions, it must refrain from fixing its supply, and absorb the
consumer surplus which would exist under compétitive conditions. This would
be the profit maximising behaviour normally expected of a monopoly under
similar conditions. Only through well defined objectives and a clear mission
statement will the management of the privatised DCE resist the monopolistic
" Bureau of Public Enterprise, State of Kamataka, Public Sector Enterprise. Sixth Annual Report
(Bangalore, India, 1985).
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equilibrium. It can be assumed that in many cases the success of the DCE will
attract new suppliers Info the market. This Is especially true if the privatised
DCE attempts to stray from the compétitive market equilibrium towards the
monopolistic equilibrium. New suppliers, assuming equal conditions, will
attempt to capture some of the producer surplus by undercutting the DCE. It is
up to the DCE to refrain from setting up barriers to entry.
At this point, many will say that the fondamentale that motivated our
privatisation effort are being contradicted. Privatisation was recommended as a
method to increase the effectiveness of our DCE through the added efficiency
brought on by market forces, or rather the privatised DCE's reaction to these
forces. Therefore, rather than to expect the management of a privatised DCE
under monopolistic market conditions to counter the market forces and create a
disequilibrium, it is best to implement, during the commercialisation and
privatisation process, policies which may stimulate the eventual entrance of
new suppliers within the industry. Examples of such policies can be the
development of product awareness campaigns, and /or the establishment of an
effective distribution network, which is not firm spécifie. These are just
examples of some conditions that may previousiy have caused barriers that
made it unattractive for suppliers to enter the industry. If the DCE, prior to its
privatisation, develops the appropriate market conditions in a way, which will
benefit the entire industry, there will be a greater chance that new suppliers will
follow the DCE into the market. Compétitive conditions, together with their
bénéficiai effects upon efficiency, will be reached.
In making the choice of which DCEs it should privatise, the donor will often
adopt one of two perspectives or criteria similar to those noted by Gary
Grimstone (1994) in his analysis of privatisation in the Third World :
"The privatisation criteria, on the whole, tend to compromise between
the exchequer perspective of giving up losses and holding on to
profits, and national development strategy implying a preference for
public investment in certain sectors."^®
^ Op.Cit., Gary Grimstone, p. 27
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The donors will be tempted to consider for privatisation those DCEs that are
expensive to operate and offer relatively week or intangible performances.
Whiist holding on to those offering good tangible results relative to cost. The
donor should avoid adopting such sélection criteria. In a way, the donor should
refrain from consulting its accountant on the relative cost of operating the DCEs
during its sélection process. Privatisation for DCEs should not be a budgetary
tool.
The second criteria, which calls for a sélection based upon the considération of
the stratégie or social importance of the DCE and the sector within which they
operate, may aiso be non-recommended. Together with stimulating greater
efficiency and effectiveness, privatisation is an important tool to implement self-
sustainability within a DCE. By keeping certain sectors under the donors wing,
eventhough some DCEs within this sector may be suitable for privatisation, the
donor is encouraging donor dependency which often translates into increase
inefficiencies.
Although there are many parallels between the privatisation process of public
enterprise and of DCEs, donors must not adopt the hyper-privatisation policies
similar to those adopted by many governments in the last decade. Caught in a
frenzy often encouraged by the World Bank, countries liquidated almost their
entire public enterprise System. Very little sélection to evaluate the impact and
suitability of each parastatal towards privatisation was made (see Zambia
Privatisation Authority, 1996). DCEs must be evaluated on an individual basis.
Rather than a mass policy, privatisation is more a tool that can be used to
maximise the effectiveness of a DCE and to offer sustainability to DCEs, which
have reached the end of their project life.
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2.4 How to privatise ?
The first stage in developing a privatisation policy would be to define the donor's
aim or purpose. Why is commercialisation being considered? What are its hoped-
for conséquences?
"No privatisation programme can proceed in a meaningfui sense uniess it
advances...(donor)...objectives and takes fui! account of local
sensitivities."^
Préparation:
As was expressed earlier, prier to any privatisation of a DCE, a commercialisation
process must have been completed. Every DCE bas its own specificity. They
therefore require privatisation and commercialisation programs that are tailor made
to take these spécifies into considération. Although not exhaustive the following
30lists some steps that are important to take prier to initiating privatisation.
i) DCEs must be introduced and placed under the rigorous impacts of market
surrogates like targets, performance aims, and most predominantly, external
financing limits.
ii) Redundancies of labour must be consistently and systematically dealt with.
iii) Several DCEs must be financially restructured through the introduction of
commercial accounting Systems replacing the budgetary accounting mostly used
within DCEs.
iv) Certain ad-hoc measures, calculated to improve the prospect of success of
privatisation, have to be taken. For example, asset transfers and fresh capital
Injections (sourced from donor or private finance).
v) With privatisation round the corner, DCEs have to accelerate organisational and
operational changes that pushed them nearer to the market place.
vi) The donor has to gradually cease their interventions within the management
and opération of the DCE. They must no longer perceive the DCE to be their tool
for social policies.
Op.Cit., p 3129
^ Based on a similar list focusing on public sector privatization presented by G. Grimstone in Op.Cit.
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Before initiating any privatisation measure, it is important to rally the support of
some important players who may influence the success of the privatisation
process and the resulting private DCE. Individuals within the political,
professional and business sectors whom are believed may have an influence
over the DCE will need to adhéré to the policy. The acceptance and support for
the measures by the management and staff of the DCE is most crucial.
Privatisation will bring about change. And where everthere is change there will
be résistance to it. It is therefore important to educate and involve the
management and staff of the DCE very early in the process. As much as
possible, it must be the management and staff of the DCE that take the final
décision to adopt privatisation policies, not the donor.
Since privatisation may provoke redundancies caused by the restructuring of
the workforce to suite the new commercial dynamics, the policy may not be well
^  received by labour organisations and some members of the staff. This
résistance will not only come from within the DCE but aiso from personnel of
the donors and aid agencies that fear a réduction of their work load and of their
importance through privatisation. It is therefore important for the DCE to
anticipate this reluctance and face it in a constructive manner by initiating
redeployment and retraining measures. Donors and aid agencies may have a
further rôle to play in this situation.
"It is essential to undertake a rigorous analysis of current loss, so that no false
hopes are raised about the extent of financial relief that the donor dérivés from
a given measure. To demonstrate the merit of privatisation, it is good to
calculate the comparative costs and advantages of such a measure and then
make this information public. Many, often do not realise the costs of
maintaining a subsidised DCE. The cost of an ineffective DCE is carried not
only by the donor but aIso by the economy and business community hosting the
^  OCDE Report, Privatisation in Developing Countries, 1996, p. 6
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intervention. Whereas most will predict the négative short-term affects of
privatisation caused by the DCE's structural adjustment to the measures, the
burden to the local economy of an ineffective DCE must aiso be known. The
donor is often not the best player to carry-out this autocritic.
It is important that prier to privatisation, ail législative issues influencing the
DCE and its privatisation have been cleared. Ail agreements between the DCE,
its donor(s), responsible aid agencies and local and foreign authorities have
been consulted for compatibility with the privatisation policies. Where
necessary, modifications must be made to facilitate privatisation.
The primary objective of privatisation is to more efficiently utilise the available
development resources. Players within deveiopmental co-operation should be
guided by this objective in their attempts to reform the DCE sector. Most often
the best way to serve the fondamental interests of development will be to
proceed with a graduai reform, starting with the commercialisation efforts and
the suppression of grants and subsidies. A private sector minded management
team, compensated as a fonction of results to objectives should be put in place.
One should not try to transform overnight a déficient DCE into a profitable one
under private ownership. Potentiel purchasers of a déficient DCE, if they can
be found, will most likely demand guarantees and market assistance that will
increase their investment opportunity's attractiveness. But, if market protection
is offered as an incentive to buyers, then the économie gains from increase
compétition are sacrificed.^^ Rather, a graduai transition and successfui
commercialisation will give the DCE the appropriate commercial dynamics that
will increase its attractiveness to potentiel purchasers.
The Donor must accept the DCE's pre-privatisation liabilities as a continuing
debt whose prospect of being serviced by the project is legally annulled.
Privatised DCEs should not be held accountable for their accumulated losses
32 Op.cit., cx:de
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^  prior to privatisation. As non-privatised efforts, DCEs most often do not fiave
cost recovery objectives and reiy soiely upon grants and subsidies. To impose
tfie repayment of tliese sums woutd most likely prevent any cfiances of viabiiity
for tfie privatised DCE. It must be understood by the donors thiat sums granted
prior to privatisation cannot be recoliected. As mucfi as possible the assets of
the DCE should be transferred in the name of the newiy registered private
DCE. If it is to solicit any kind of private finance, which would establish its self-
sufficiency, the private DCE will need an opening balance sheet representing
an acceptable collatéral base. If the donors are unwilling to transfer the DCE's
assets, often due to the donors internai charters preventing direct grants to
private enterprises, they may prefer to opt for a delayed repayment contract.
A private company must be registered according to the local législation of the
country where the interventions are based. The Acts of Association will greatly
dépend on the nature of the DCE and of the applicable législation. The DCE
I  may want to consult some légal or business advice in order to formulate a
private enterprise that will best be able to carry out the functions and objectives
set for the privatised DCE. An internai shareholders agreement will aiso need
to be formulated by the founding shareholders assembly.
Several Matters, including the 'spécial share' should be left to the shareholders
agreement, which donors should not be concerned with while passing the Act.
A short list of some specificities of the shareholding structure, which the Donor
should leave to the shareholders agreement, is as follows:^
i) The extent of shareholding which a single shareholder in permitted to hold.
ii) The extent of any Donor shareholding.
iii) 'Spécial Shares'
iv) the limits of foreign or/and external ownership
v) any spécial forms of accountability to the consumer or the public either over
i Based on public sector privatisation theory presented by G. Grimstone in Op.CiL
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a transitory period or for a far longer period.
vi) any déviation from tfie provisions of the Companies Act (if legally possible),
for a transitory period. Ideally, these should be minimised.
At this point, new proprietors for the privatised DCE must be identified and
chosen. This choice may often be limited by the availability of entrepreneurs
willing to invest in an organisation that has never had any private experience
and therefore offers great uncertainty of success. The choice of a new owner
for the DCE should not be made based on a quantitative évaluation. Rather,
the compatibility of the new owner with the set objectives of the DCE and their
potential ability to carry these out, should govern the choice of new owners, not
the offered price.
Most often, the best option for new owners of a privatised DCE will be found
internally. The DCEs staff and management will usually have a much clearer
view of the objectives set for the DCE and how to attain them. Internai
ownership or buyout is an option which will offer an alternative not only when
no external offers are made but aiso should be compared to ail other offers.
2.5 Associative methods and why
"...productivity and profitability have soared in the newiy privatised
companies. It is no mystery why privatisation has succeeded. The
majority of employées have become shareholders in the newiy
privatised companies. They want their companies to succeed. Their
companies have been released from the detailed controls of Whitehall
and given freedom to manage their own affaire."^
"By making an employée a shareholder in the business employing him . . .
stimulâtes his zeal and carefui working." (Catherine webb, 1912, p. 138)
The privatisation of a DCE through the trade of its assets, expertise and name
to private individuels or organisations can often lead to important allocative
^ The Next Moves Forward. the Conservative Manifeste (London) 1987, pp.35-7
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distortions. Potential external purchasers of a DCE will have no reason to adopt
the objectives set by the donors. The way to prevent the ailocative distortions
and to help keep the privatised DCE's objectives in line with those given to it by
the donors in the short to médium term is to keep a significant share of the
ownership internai to the DCE. By having a voice in the policy making of the
DCE through internai shares, the staff and management of the DCE can exert a
form of control on the direction that the private DCE adopts.
Internai ownership will have positive affects, not only on the ailocative aspects
of the privatisation, but will aiso stimulate higher rates of efficiency and
dedication from the management and staff of the privatised DCE. Internai share
schemes can be seen as a way of aligning the goals of donors, management,
staff, and shareholders. Internai share schemes should be designed to cover
ail employées in order to motivate increased co-operation through horizontal
monitoring, increase commitment and solicit longer term improvements in
productivity.
Ordinary share schemes may not be sufficient to protect the ailocative
objectives of the DCE, especially if a significant portion of the DCE's
shareholding is offered to external parties. It is often not in the best interest of
the DCE to keep ail of the shareholding internai. External parties, active in the
private sector may bring a richness of commercial experience, guidance, and
contacts which can become very valuable assets towards the success of the
newiy privatised DCE. Therefore, in the case of a combined internai and
external ownership structure, the staff and management of the DCE as
individual shareholders may not individually have sufficient say in the
company's affaire to carry out the monitoring rôle intended. At the same time,
the relative insignificance of the individual shares of each staff member,
especially in the case of large DCEs, may not stimulate the motivational
benefits desired by the scheme. It has been argued during the use of internai
share schemes to commercialise the Eastern European économies that "There
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can exist injustices of allocating property rights to employées on the basis of
where they happen to be employed at a particular time ; Tfie potential for
bribery and corruption ; and the probiems of exposing workers to risk in
économies where newiy privatised firms are extremely prone to early
bankruptcies."^
On the latter issue, from an investor's point of view, the discounted share price
would have to offer sufficient additional return to compensate an employée for
bearing the increased unsystematic (firm-specific) risk (Peel, Pendiebury and
Groves, 1991). A counter argument is that these higher income risks are
compensated by the increased job security derived from employée ownership.
Moreover, employées who hold shares of their own company have at least
some information, control and even voting rights attached to their shares.
In order to answer the probiems observed in a conventional internai share
scheme, DCEs should adopt an associative internai ownership structure similar
to that of the American employée share ownership programmes, (ESOP),
couple with external ownership. The ESOP provokes the same motivational
benefits as the conventional share scheme with the added advantage of
collective ownership that gives rise to the possibility that "current employées
can have a significant voice, as a block shareholder, in the affaire of the
company."^
Employée share ownership will allow the employées of the privatised DCE to
share in performance and growth in profits via appreciating share values and/or
the receipt of dividende. Employées can aiso own shares in their employing
DCE as an individual, in addition to those owned collectively. These individuel
shares may be used by the DCE as performance bonuses in order to prevent a
free rider situation from affecting the labour force. If ail employées receive a
" Op.Cit., Grimstone, p. 43
Nick Wilson, Employée Ownership : ESOPs in Context, Bradford University Press, 1997, p. 16
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profit share or a share allocation regardiess of their individual efforts then
incentives may be weakened. Some share schemes are set up for the purpose
of rewarding employées with additional income on the basis of enterprise
performance and this provides the link with profit sharing. Shares may be
reserved for employées to purchase and offered on privileged terms or,
alternatively, employées may be offered options to purchase shares on
preferential terms after a predetermined time period has elapsed.
The DCE, following privatisation, should first build a collective share scheme
(ESOP) initiated by staff and management participation and demand. Only after
the DCE's performance has reach satisfactory performance levels, which permit
it to generate positive returns, can an individual share scheme be introduced,
offering the desired motivational stimuli. The combination of ESOP structure
and individual shares can lead to an efficient and effective privatised DCE. The
complexity of the schemes, though, must be kept low for them to work and
survive. If the staff finds the scheme too complicated and its administration too
time consuming compared to the benefits it generates, participation to the
ESOP will drop and the collective scheme will fail to reach its motivational
objectives. The ESOP must be initiated from the staff and management of the
privatised DCE and must be understood and accepted by the greater majority
of the labour force. Employée éducation is important to increase the
understanding and acceptance of the scheme. A collective scheme such as the
ESOP which is imposed upon the staff of a DCE is bound to fail since its
members will not appreciate the benefits of démocratie management nor will
they fully participate and administer what is viewed as not of their making.
Similarly, if the membership of an ESOP does not understand the scheme
perfectiy, false expectations or disinterest will prevent the ESOP from
succeeding in its objectives.
i
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The ESOP structure has been described as being a particularly usefui solution
for handiing succession problems.^^ These characteristics can be equaliy
usefui in the case of succession from a donor driven to a privatised DCE.
ESOPs offer the opportunity for employées and management to become more
involved in the privatisation effort. The ESOP will purchase shares of the DCE
at the same price offered to external players in the privatisation bid. This can
secure wider employée and management commitment to the privatisation in the
short and longer term. It can aiso facilitate the recruitment (by offering shares)
of new high quality members of management and staff following the
privatisation.
Proponents of associative employée ownership schemes advance the following
reason why such a scheme will positively impact the performance of the
Company.
(1 ) ESOPs provide an incentive to increase employée work effort;
(2) ESOPs lead to more positive worker attitudes, co-operative behaviour and
financial 'awareness';
(3) ESOPs stimulate increased organisational efficiency through information
sharing;
(4) ESOPs can decrease worker management tensions over pay and
démarcation;
(5) Firms with an ESOP structure have a greater responsiveness to change;
(6) The ESOP structure within a firm leads to réductions in labour turnover and
absenteeism;
(7) Therefore stimulating a growth in the stock of human capital.
"Op.Cit.,P.17
Robin Blagbum, Financing ESOPs : The Company's wider perspective, Unity Trust Bank publication,
Atlanta, 1997, p. 113
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"Empirical studies have found that joint dedsion-nnaklng, worker
ownershlp and profit sharing, especiaily when used in conjunction with
each other are capable of generating the greatest productivity and
performance gains"^®
The overall organisational efficiency of an privatised DCE using associative
ownershlp structures can rise from the incentive for employée owners to share
information. The introduction of employée profit sharing and share schemes
can break down bureaucratie centralised décision making and costly monitoring
activities over time. In organisations where rewards are linked to overall
Company performance, individual managers and workers no longer have an
incentive to hoard information in orderto enhance their own relative position or
to disguise their own efforts. Thus, where there are incentives for employées to
share information at ail levels, the firm is expected to benefit from better-
informed décisions embodied in both workers' experience and technical
information about production possibilities.
The financial involvement of the staff of a DCE with internai associative
ownershlp wiil impact on labour turnover and absenteeism. If employées
identify more strongly with the firm because of the doser link between
rémunération and work effort or because of the deferred nature of ESOP
benefits or simply because of the psychology of ownershlp, then employée
turnover may be reduced. In addition the firm is more likely to encourage
additional investments in firm-specific skills or human capital in a low turnover
environment. Furthermore, if firms with share schemes are able to retain
employées then it may aiso be the case that these firms will be better able to
attract a high quality workforce. An employer can not only offer the employée a
contract which links effort to financial reward and job security but aIso induces
a 'commonality' of goals between members of the organisation.
Op.Cit., Nick Wilson, p.23
Op.Cit., p. 24
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To sum up, internai associative ownership has the potential to transform the
employment relation and its rôle as a force for changing organisational culture
towards co-operation, flexibility and shared goals within a privatised DCE.
Higher économie efficiency will be gained not only in its narrow sense through
the improvements in quality and technical progressiveness, but aiso the
"greater social efficiency of work as an institution, satisfying human aspirations
for self-fulfilment and needs for involvement and social interaction.""^
The literature supporting associative internai ownership schemes argues that
'manager controlled' firms perform less well than 'owner controlled' firms
because in the former managers and employées are more able to pursue
objectives other than shareholder weaith maximisation. Some researchers have
linked to productivity growth the extent of internai ownership of equity. The
arguments in favour of a positive association between productivity growth and
internai ownership run as follows, (1) "employées work harder if they own a
higher proportion of equity because they bear a higher cost if they malinger; (2)
firms with high employée ownership of equity are to some extent protected from
take-overs and, in conséquence, are more likely to be able to resist short term
capital market pressure. This gives rise to a greater concern for longer term
performance goals such as productivity growth at the expense of 'short
termism'.""^
In contrast to these views, J. Blasi suggests that in practice most employées,
specifically managers, "are unwilling or unable to institute organisational
changes in their companies that would ensure employée ownership really made
a big différence""^
Jones, D.C., and T. Kato, On the Scope, Nature and Ejfects of Employée Ownership, Hamilton
Collège, 1990, p. 13
Op.Cit., p. 20
As cited in Flnancial Tîmes, 24 Mardi 1992.
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Similarly, there is a view that as internai sharehoiding increases employées
become less subject to the control of external shareholders. This may have the
effect of reducing productivity growth because (!) entrenched employées may
slack effort; (2) when employée ownership Is significant, employées forego the
optimal risk réduction that could have been achieved by holding their financial
assets in a more diversified portfolio. This ultimately raises the cost of capital
and may depress spending on R&D, reducing productivity growth; (3)
managers may be selected and promoted on the basis of their equity stake and
not their décision making skills."*^
The main safeguard against these risks comes from an important
transcompany participation within the démocratie management of the collective.
This universel participation establishes within the privatised DCE a good
System of horizontal monitoring. The risks of inefficient behaviour, such as
described above, can only occur through the lack of peer-monitoring and
communication within the associative structure. Smaller groups within the
collective, such as management, must not be allowed to impose their own will
upon the collective. Because these inefficiencies can only occur at the
détriment of the collective, a well functioning démocratie management structure
will avoid their existence. Another safeguard in our proposed structure for the
privatised DCE comes from the possible presence of an external sharehoiding.
External shareholders will be less influence by the internai dynamics and
influences within the DCE. They will bring an additional source of monitoring
against the development of inefficiencies.
In 1990, 91 percent of quoted companies in Japan had an ESOP
(mochikabukai) associative internai ownership structure with an average labour
force participation rate of 45.8 per cent. Individuel sharehoiding stakes on
average were thought to amount to 2.179 million yen per employée.'^
Op.Cit., Nick Wilson, p.24
A report by Nomura Securities, 1990, as found in Op.Cit.
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Blasi and Kruse (1991) in a major study of employée ownership in the USA, list
several engines propelling the expansion of ESOPs. First, employée stock
ownership is becoming an accepted and common method of corporate finance.
Second, the employée shareholder has the potentiel of being more involved in
co-operating with management, improving the performance of the company and
playing a rôle in corporate governance. Third, the employées' collective block
of shares is increasingly being used strategically to ward off asset strippers, to
encourage long termism in investment activity and involve employées in
Corporate decision-making. Finally, they suggest that ESOPs represent a
fondamental change in the pattern of employée retirement saving that is fast
replacing the fixed wage and benefits Systems of the post-war period."®
"Evidence from the US suggests that even amongst the largest public
companies ESOPs are beginning to acquire a meaningfui stake in the
enterprise and ultimately in corporate governance."'*^
The privatised DCE with an internai associative ownership structure will be
more likely to stress greater social importance within its policy making
décisions. This more "human" form of business structure is well suited for the
purposes of DCE privatisation since it allows the DCE to retain a greater
allocative mission. "If corporations and workers succeed in combining
employée ownership with more activism in corporate governance, they will
surely create the seems of a new model of labour-management relations and
capitalist production : Capitalism, with a human face."'*®
An important problem which privatising DCE's may face is one of the workers'
ability and/or willingness to defer current consomption and go in for savings
and investments. In low income countries, this is an even greater problem.
Blasi, J. and I. Kruse, The New Owners, The Mass Emergence of Employée Ownership in Public
Companies and What it Means to American Business, Harper Business, New York, 1991, pp.196-197
Op.Cit., p. 247
Op.Cit., p. 255
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Share bonuses may be oftered so that the employées become sizeable owners
of the enterprise - in theory but not in practice - for they have consumption
commitments aiready, or they would sel! away the share-property at the
slightest pinch of need. if restrictions are placed on share transferability, their
very acceptance of the scheme can be doubtful.''®
Social attitudes in some countries can operate against certain classes of
buyers - certain groups or tribes in the country or non-indigenous nationale.
Similarly, démocratie management may be a concept that is not suited to
certain cultures. Even with the greatest efforts to enforce a démocratie
structure, social hiérarchies may prevail within the collective. DCEs facing
privatisation in LCD countries may encounter additional obstacles associated
to :
i) Economies of scale and the intrinsic scope for introducing compétition in
many sectors of privatisable activity may be more limited than in developed
économies.
ii) Constraints on entry and exit are likely to be more severe.
iii) Technical skills in establishing are not likely to be abondant.
iv) Governmental and similar external interventions into the process.
The problems pose by the practical limits to compétition in the privatised
industries merit the serious attention of developing countries. There is a body
of opinion in many developing countries to the effect that the assumptions of
efficiency on the part of private enterprise and of its entrepreneurial dynamism
call for rigorous scrutiny. Hence, it is argued, the benefits of privatisation are
likely to be less than in developed économies.®"
Op.CiL, Nick Wilson, p.42
^ Robert Millward, Measured Sources ofinefficiency in the Performance of Private and Public
Enterprises in LCDs, Oxford, 1997, p. 146
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1) "Il is not necessarily through efficiency that private enterprise in developing
countries make profits. They operate under conditions of monopoly or
oligopoly. Often the total supply on the part of an industry falls short of the
demand for its products. Many enterprises enjoy the benefits of tariff protection.
The infant industry argument is stretched far too long."
il) "Many private enterprises are 'sick'."
iii) "The question must be ask, How private are private enterprises in
developing countries?"
iv) "The segment of equity investment in the total capital procured by private
enterprises is relatively low."
v) 'Tax évasion in some cases of private, but not public, enterprises and that it
tends to impose more social costs on the community than public enterprise
does."
The experience in developed countries has shown that, even where there is a
sophisticated financial infrastructure, it is difficult to establish the appropriate
market value for the enterprise assets. The absence of a well-developed
financial System means that divestiture will have to be made by direct
placements with local or foreign interests large enough to handie the
transaction. The donor may be unwilling, however, to have its assets
transferred to certain groups of potential buyers, if it results in a further
concentration of wealth. In some countries, it will be politically unacceptable to
sell enterprises to wealthy racial minority groups. Similar objections may be
raised to increased ownership by foreign interests.
The donor/aid agencies, will often be tempted to retain some shares of the
DCE for the sake of monitoring. This, of-course would go against the self-
sufficiency aims behind the entire privatisation process. But a transition period
may be warranted to help guide the young company. There is often strong view
on the side of the investors that partial ownership by the donor might constitute
a vehicle of undue interférence and control and affect the efficiency of the
enterprise. On the other hand, some investors may find reassurance and
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increase confidence if the donor remained involved in the enterprise through
equity participation. An orientation committee can be form to help guide the
young private DCE to success. Within this orientation committee, influential
members of the local industry, business persons, and politicians can be invited
to suggest policies to the DCE's général assembly and Board of Directors. The
Donor may want to take its place within this Committee. In no way, though,
must the Orientation Committee carry more than advisory powers over the
DCE's shareholders.
2.6 Economie Theory
There are three différent reasonings linking employée share ownership to
improved organisational performance. In the intrinsic satisfaction model,
Kathrine Klein argues that the simple fact of ownership should be intrinsically
rewarding to employées, and lead to more positive job attitudes; alternatively
the extrinsic satisfaction model suggests that employée ownership will have
favourable conséquences only if it is financially rewarding to employées; and
finally, the instrumental satisfaction model establishes an intervening link in
that the positive conséquences of employée share ownership are deemed to
occur only via the wider employée participation and the influence in corporate
governance and decision-making that results.®^
On a similar note Richard Long postulâtes that employée share ownership
motivâtes improved performance by affecting 'organisational identification'
which he defines as consisting of three interrelated phenomena: (a) feelings of
shared characteristics and common goals, (b) feelings of 'belongingness' or
solidarity with the organisation, and (C) loyalty or support to the organisation.
These are labelled respectively as, organisational intégration, involvement and
commitment, which Long emphasises arises through increased overall
employée involvement not ownership per se.®^
" Katherine Klein as found in Nick Wilson's, Employée Ownership ESOPs in Context, p.27
Richard Long as in Op.Cit., p. 27
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2.7 Concluding Part II
In this second part of the essay I focused on the very particular policy
alternative for inducing increased efficlency within a DCE which Is that of
privatisation. I analysed which DCEs can possibly benefit from this extreme
form of commercialisation covering the need for a marketable product. I went
further by listing which types of DCEs should and should not be privatised.
Here I covered four main types of DCEs ; Those whose objectives have been
achieved ; Those whose fonctions could be absorbed by local organisations ;
Those whose fonctions coold be performed by the existing private sector ; and
Those whose fonctions can not be effectively ondertaken by any other existing
commercial or non-commercial organisation. In oor analysis I argoed that only
those DCEs falling onder oor foorth category shoold be sobjected to a
privatisation policy. I continoed by presenting the considérations which shoold
motivate the choice of a DCE for privatisation and emphasised that it was
important that no forther assistance, not offered to the rest of the indostry,
shoold be given to the DCE following its privatisation.
The topic of how to privatise a DCE was aboarded next. Identification of the
objectives of the privatisation was listed as having particular importance. We
finished by introdocing an associative method as the most appropriate
organisational structure for a privatised DCE. Explaining the benefits of soch a
structure and its compatibility with the social mission of most DCEs.
Concluding this essay, the following part offers an illustrative présentation of an
attempt at the commercialisation and privatisation of a DCE. This case study, I
hope, will give the reader a better idea of the possible applicability of the
concepts discussed within this essay.
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PART III
Practical application - Case Study
The Zimbabwe OU Press Project (ZOPP) Is a project which was inltiated In
Zimbabwe in 1989 by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) World
University Services of Canada (WUSC). A WUSC development worker
teaching at the Old Mutare Mission school in Zimbabwe's eastern province of
Manicaland attempted to copy a oil pressing machine he had seen at a school
where he previousiy taught in Tanzania. Engineering plans for the ram-press
were sourced and a prototype was made through a local machine shop. The
ram-press was used as an income generating project for the mission and its
school.
Realising the potentiel benefits which the oil press could bring to neighbouring
rural communities as an income generating tool, WUSC was approached to
help administer and fund the dissémination of the press on a larger scale. A
small number of presses were produced and distributed in the Mashonaland
East and Manicaland provinces of Zimbabwe.
The press rapidiy became popular within the communities in which they were
used. There were still many problems, though, with the quality and reliability of
the presses produced locally. The Washington based non-governmental
organisation, Appropriate Technologies International (ATI), which had
developed the ram-press used in Tanzania, upon which the Zimbabwean press
was inspired, was contacted to assist in solving some of these problems.
ATl's engineer Cari Bielenberg in 1985 developed the particular type of ram-
press promoted in Tanzania and copied in Zimbabwe. ATI was promoting the
dissémination of the press in both Tanzania and Uganda. When told of the
efforts of WUSC in Zimbabwe they rapidiy offered to participate in developing a
full scale project aimed at the promotion and proper use of the ram-press as an
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income generating tool through oil seed processing in Zimbabwe. In 1989 the
Zimbabwe Oil Press Project (ZOPP) was put into action as a joint
administrative effort of both WUSC and ATI, funded by various donors and aid
agencies soiicited by AT! and WUSC. ZOPP had as its initial objectives the
promotion and dissémination of ram press technology in Zimbabwe's Eastern
and Northern provinces.
3.1 Background Leading to Problematic
MoPherson Study
In 1994, the Ram-press technology was successfully introduced in Tanzania,
Uganda and Zimbabwe by ATI administered projects. The initiai objectives of
the projects having been accompiished, ATI officiais wanted to préparé a five-
year pian that would iilustrate the new stratégies for the ram-press projects.
Seing projects, and therefore by définition being a finite entity, ATI wanted to
préparé the termination of the projects. It was widely expressed by ATl's fieid
staff that the termination of the projects at this point wouid create a vacuum that
would not be filled and therefore would lead to the eventual death of the ram-
press technology in the différent countries concerned.
ATI contracted Mr Andrew MoPherson, a specialist in African agro-business
deveiopment, to do a study that evaiuated the possibilities avaiiabie to ATI. The
main objective of the study was to identify ways in reducing the involvement of
ATI in the promotion of the ram-press technology without affecting the results
aiready attained by the projects. The technology had to survive without the
projects.
Mr MoPherson arrived at a sériés of recommendations that wouid guide the
stratégies to be inciuded in the five-year pians of the ATI ram-press projects. Of
the recommendations made, two were of prime importance and upon which the
others focused.
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The first recommendation was based on the overall main finding of the study
which was that the promotion of the ram-press technology had to be taken over
by the private sector if it was going to survive without any donor assistance.
Based on this finding the new challenge for the ATI projects was to develop a
suitable environment for the transition of the promotional rôle of the ram-press
technology to the private sector. The recommendation suggested that if private
entities could not be identified to accomplish this rôle, then the projects
themselves should privatise.
It was discovered during the research leading to the conclusions of the study
that there was an absence of private entities in the différent markets within
which the projects were operating willing and able to take over the tasks
previousiy held by the projects. The most likely candidates for this rôle were the
différent machine and métal shops that were contracted by the projects to
produce the presses marketed. When approached, though, the owners of these
businesses expressed near unanimous reluctance to fill the fonctions of ram-
press marketers and promoters. The main reasons given for their reluctance
were that of ; the lack of ability, experience and will, as manufacturing units to
take over marketing fonctions ; the lack of resources to effectively engage in a
viable promotion of the press ; and the lack of interest and belief in the viability
of the ram-press technology as a commercial product.
Without any private sector candidates it was therefore up to the individuel
projects to privatise and continue their promotional rôle as private and self-
sufficient enterprises.
The second main recommendation of the study suggested the establishment of
a régional co-ordination unit to be set-up on the field and which would assist
and monitor the privatisation efforts of the différent projects. This
recommendation led to the formation of the Régional Oils (OILS) office based
in Zimbabwe but which covered ail three country projects and even explored
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the possible development of new projeots in neighbouring oountries. Together
with its co-ordination efforts, it was also hoped that OILS would initiate the
process towards the independence of the projeots by bringing the monitoring
rôles from Washington to the African continent. This would break the umbilical
link, which previousiy assured the comfortable survival of the projeots. As OILS
was meant as a non-permanent entity, it would gradually relieve itself from
involvement into the new commercial units which the projeots were expected to
become. Once the projeots would reach self-sufficiency, OILS would cease its
opérations.
3.2 Privatisation efforts
It was decided that although the privatisation efforts would run simultaneousiy
in ail three country projeots, ZOPP would act somewhat as a guinea pig and
would initiate the policies. Since OILS was based in Zimbabwe, it was therefore
easier to monitor and adjust the implementation of différent policies in
Zimbabwe. ZOPP also had developed a much more centralised operational
System relative to the other projeots that permitted greater ease when initiating
and evaluating these new policies.
To assist the ZOPP Project Manager in the privatisation efforts, it was agreed
to call upon WUSC to supply an advisor to the project. An advisor with
commercial experience was required to assist in the additional workioad
brought on by the privatisation process. This would prevent the Project
Manager from losing focus on the daily opérations and more immédiate
objectives of the project.
The Advisor was responsible for setting up Systems for a viable business
enterprise through;
- Developing a market survey to détermine the demand for the ZOPP products
both in Zimbabwe and possitjly the région (Southern Africa).
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- Reviewing/developing the Business Plan - reviewing the existing plan and
developing an appropriate one.
- Assisting In setting up a marketing plan for ZOPP products.
- Reviewing the existing product portfolio and recommend possible additions.
- Developing an appropriate reporting System for ZOPP Ltd - financlally and
qualltatively.
- Tralning ZOPP staff In appropriate areas.
The Advisor was meant to co-ordinate the commercialisation process, required
prior to privatisation, by Introducing to ZOPP's opérations the Systems and
dynamics which would allow for Its viabllity as a private enterprise.
Unfortunately ZOPP's administrators did not differentlate between
commercialisation and privatisation. To them, both pollcles were part of the
same process. In fact, throughout the entire transition the word privatisation
was almost never used, commercialisation defined the entire process of
transforming the DCE Into a viable enterprise and Its proposed change of
ownership Into the private sector.
ZOPP was pushed Into the deep end of the private sector before the
appropriate commercial dynamics had been Introduced. This created a great
deal of confusion for the management and staff of the DCE whIch were told to
adopt cost recovery pollcles but aiso to submit their projected annual budgetary
requirements. At the time that ZOPP Ltd. was registered, ZOPP's costs were
more than ten times larger then Its revenues. Important restructuring was
necessary to create a viable enterprise.
ZOPP Ltd was therefore only a name kept wlthout any Internai structure nor
any ownership structure for some tIme untll viabllity, or a resemblance of such,
could be establlshed. In the mean tIme It would have to be discovered If ZOPP
had a potentlal as a private enterprise through a market study.
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The market study did find the possibility of viability based on the markets demand
for its products. But, the study listed a sériés of preconditions that needed to be
fulfilied in order for ZOPP Ltd to have a chance at viability. An adéquate
distribution System would need to be developed, more efficient production,
opération and administration methods would need to be developed, ZOPP's
product line would need to be enlarged, intensive promotion of ZOPP and its
products would need to be carried out, and export markets would need to be
penetrated in order to increase the potentiel sales volume for ZOPP. Basically the
Market study was calling for the commercialisation of ZOPP's opération before a
viable private enterprise could take form.
During the first six months following the market study, ZOPP's staff made
impressive progress in developing the commercial Systems called for by the market
study. An efficient distribution System was developed using existing national
agricultural and hardware retail chains. The numbers of possible points of
purchase for ZOPP's products grew from the one single Harare office to a network
of over 60 outlets throughout the country. ZOPP led an initiative in collaboration
with the Ugandan and Tanzanian projects to establish a mass manufacturing
facility which could produce a superior product at a much reduced cost. Many
internai Systems within ZOPP were revised to increase operational efficiency and
increase cost recovery. An intensive nation wide promotional campaign was
initiated. And several market development initiatives were taken to attempt to
introduce ZOPP's products within neighbouring countries with the resuit that close
to 50% of the sales in ZOPP Ltd's first two quarters came from exports.
The commercialisation process was moving surprisingly well taking into
considération that the entire privatisation process had been very badiy planned.
Other than agreeing upon the concept of self-sufficiency through private sector
involvement, ZOPP's administrators, ATI and Oils, did not really know where they
were heading nor how to get there. ZOPP's staff, though, had more or less taken
things into there own hands and were moving things forward.
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Upon the commercialisation advisor's suggestion for the most équitable way ot
privatising the donor funded project, ZOPP's staff began developing an
ownership structure for ZOPP Ltd which coupied an associative internai
ownership with a strong but minor externat unrestricted private ownership. It
was l<nown that ZOPP needed to improve its performance before it could attract
any externat interest for its shares. As for the internat shares, a savings
scheme initiated and administered cottectivety by the staff was set up where an
amount was deduced from the pays of each staff member and deposited info a
high yietding, though secure and tax-free, savings placement, tt was now a
matter of negotiating with ATt for the transfer of ZOPP's assets to ZOPP Ltd
and to agree on a detayed payment structure for the cottective shares. The
compréhension of the associative concept and the organisationat abitities
which ZOPP's staff demonstrated towards estabtishing the scheme was
remarkabte.
ZOPP's smooth and rapid transition towards becoming a commercial entity did
not tast very long, though. As was said before, change witt bring about
résistance. But the résistance in the case of ZOPP's privatisation came from a
source that at first may seem surprising.
ATI had originatty estabtished ZOPP as a project and had initiated the
privatisation process fottowing Mr McPherson's recommandation in his study
into the best way to terminate ATt's Ram-Press projects and assure the
permanence of the appropriate technologies the project disseminated. Now
though, ZOPP's pace seemed to quicl< for them. They could not keep track of
the changes, and from their offices in Washington, they were beginning to think
that things were out of control. In-fact things were not out of control, but rather
increasingly out of ATl's control. One of the first measures which was taken by
ZOPP's staff to help increase the operational efficiency was to change from
monthly to quarterly reporting which ATI demanded from ZOPP's staff. This did
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not help to reduce ATl's feeling that it was no longer In charge. Some of ATl's
staff began to question the necessity of privatisation and the effect that the
process may have on theircareers.
Therefore, in an effort to take back control of the process but aiso to protect
their own self interest, AT! began to intervene within the privatisation process.
These were most often unproductive. AT! interfered with ZOPP's progress
creating set backs in the privatisation process. AIso, ATI began demanding that
it be allocated a significant percentage of ZOPP Ltd's shareholding. The
deveiopmental justification behind this request was never made clear other
than the desire to maintain control. ATI then refuse to allow the planned
transfer of assets to ZOPP Ltd's name. Without asset, therefore collatéral,
ZOPP Ltd could not approach the private financial markets for finance, forcing
a continued dépendance on AT! administered donor funds. Without collatéral
ZOPP Ltd's shares would aIso be quasi-worthless.
It would be wrong to say that these interventions on the part of AT! were
deliberately counter productive. Rather, more at fault was the lack of business
expertise and commercial dynamism within ATl's staff attached to ZOPP. ATl's
staff did not well comprehend the concept of privatisation and what was needed
to reach this goal. They aIso had very little confidence in the abilities of ZOPP's
staff. Continuousiy ATI would delay the privatisation process in order to double
check with their own advisors and consultants the recommendations made by
ZOPP's staff.
ATI was adapted to working at a pace and with a dynamism not suitable for
commercial opérations. When they demanded that the privatisation process be
slowed down to their pace with their methodology and reporting Systems, it
meant that the entire commercial dynamism which had been established by
ZOPP's staff would now have to be regressed into its previous non-commercial
form.
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Consequently, now that their accomplishments were being questioned and
sabotaged, the staff of ZOPP rapidiy became disenchanted with the entire
process. Motivation within ZOPP dramatically fell. And participation to the
collective saving scheme halted.
At the time this essay was written, three years following the initiation of the
privatisation policies, ZOPP's privatisation was still incomplète. The ultimate
objective behind the privatisation was to put in place the appropriate business
Systems for the création of a viable business enterprise which would continue
the dissémination and promotion of the Ram-Press and possible other similar
appropriate technologies in a self-sufficient manner. Yet today, ZOPP Ltd is in
no way a viable and self sufficient enterprise. It has apparently abandoned ail
efforts of becoming such. The project's dependence on donor funds has
poisoned its commercial intents. Unfortunately, when donors will cease to see
developmentai value in the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project, a project that will soon
reach its tenth year of existence, ZOPP may be faced with closure.
The original objective of ATI, if we are to go back to the terms of reference of
Mr McPherson's report, was to help find a way to reach continuity in the
promotion of the ram-press technology within the countries served by AT!
projects once the projects would be terminated. Mr McPherson's main finding
was that in order to prevent the disappearance of the technology following the
removal of the project, the private sector would have to take over its promotion.
The absence of private sector interest at the time led to the suggestion that
maybe the projects should be privatised and fulfil the rôle themselves. From the
lack of private sector alternatives, the concept of privatisation was born. It is
important to note that the preferred scénario would have been that a private
sector enterprise take over the technology's promotion and distribution.
67
Commercialisation and Associative Privatisation 14/04/99
of Developmentai Co-operation Efforts Maîtrise en Gestion et
Essai de Maîtrise Dévéiopment des Coopératives
Yancy Vaillant Université de Sheiijrocke
During the first year of its commercialisation process, ZOPP Ltd was able to
bring market awareness of the ram-press technology to significantly higher
levais then had ever reached ZOPP NGO in its eight years off existence. The
popularity of the ram-press by the end of the intervention had stimulated the
emergence of competitors in the market. This compétition was aggressively
countered by ZOPP Ltd who attempting to act as a commercial entity wanted to
protect its market share.
Because ZOPP Ltd never became a true private sector enterprise, it not only
failed to reach the ultimate goal which was to have a self-sufficient private
sector promotion and distribution of the ram-press technology, but ZOPP is in
tact actively countering and preventing this goal from being reached by fighting
the emergence of private sector competitors. ZOPP, as it stand today, benefits
from unfair économie advantages coming from the heavy subsidies which
keeps it operating. ZOPP is creating disequilibrium in the market, which if
persisted, may bring the market back to the point where it began, and private
sector interest in the ram-press will disappear. With the higher quality of
purchaser support established through the distribution System, a subsidised
ZOPP, in the presence of private sector compétition no longer has any rôle to
play and should be terminated as a project.
ZOPP had its chance to become self-sufficient, unfortunately ATI was not ready
to pay the sacrifices that this séparation would cause. It can be strongly
questioned whether privatisation was the proper policy décision to take
following Mr McPherson's study. The failed privatisation attempt by ZOPP Ltd
demonstrated clearly that through commercial attitudes and dynamics, an NGO
Project such as ZOPP could achieve their developmentai goals by stimulating
the proper market forces which would encourage private sector participation
towards these goals.
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ZOPP Ltd managed to achieve more in Its one true year of transition to the
private sector, through the use of commercial dynamics and efficiency
stimulating policies, as compared to the previous eight years as an NGO using
socio-developmental project management stratégies. This period of transition
can in-fact be compared to the commercialisation process as described earlier
in this essay. ZOPP did not need to privatise to assure the continued promotion
and dissémination of the ram-press. Following the year of commercialisation,
enough interest had been generated in the market for the technology that
players within the private sector were now willing to take over the objectives set
behind the privatisation.
ZOPP Ltd could have become a successfui and viable associative enterprise if
AT! had not aborted the privatisation process. But it is aiso believed that the
optimal deveiopmental impact would have been reach if following one intense
year of commercialisation, developing market Systems which would allow for a
viable promotion and distribution of the ram-press technology, ZOPP would
have let itself be absorbed by its competitors.
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